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LAUNCHING THE ROCKET INDUSTRY IN THE





0 N SEPTEMBER 9, 1982, Space Services Incorporated
of America (SSI) became the first American company
to launch a rocket into space.I Using its own launching
facilities located on Matagorda Island, Texas, SSI sent the
Conestoga I into a sub-orbital flight that officially
launched the development of a new American industry-
Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV's).2 The success of the
* B.S., B.A., Kansas State University;J.D., Georgetown University Law Center;
Mr. Webber is an associate with Baker & McKenzie in Washington, D.C.
, See SPACE SERVICES INC. OF AMERICA, CONESTOGA I MISSION REPORT 3 (March
9, 1983) (submitted to the FAA) [hereinafter cited as MIssIoN REPORT]. SSI's ex-
press objectives were to: (1) demonstrate SSI's ability to fund, organize and de-
velop a completely private launch capability; (2) to develop a cooperative working
relationship with the relevant federal agencies; (3) to acquire operational experi-
ence; (4) to develop a model private launch site; (5) to predict the success of orbi-
tal operations based on sub-orbital performance; and (6) to compare the
performance of Conestoga I to the design mission. Id. at 3. SSI accomplished
each of these objectives. Id. at 1.
The Conestoga was not SSI's first attempt to launch a space vehicle. In 1981,
SSI planned to launch the Percheron I but failed when the engine exploded in a
test fire.
"-' See MISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-5 (discussing objectives, structure, and
performance of the Conestoga launch).
Although private enterprise has long been in the business of manufacturing
ELV's, only NASA had launched such a vehicle in the United States prior to the
Conestoga I flight. Four companies manufacture successfully used expendable
launch vehicles: Martin Marietta (Titan, used primarily by the Defense Depart-
ment); McDonnell Douglas (Delta, used by NASA); General Dynamics (Atlas, used
by NASA and the Defense Department); and LTV Aerospace (Scout, used by
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Conestoga launch demonstrates that private enterprise
can organize, fund, and conduct commercial rocket
launches using private facilities, without government sub-
sidization. SSI plans to launch the Conestoga II in 1984
or 1985 to place a commercial satellite into low earth
orbit.4
NASA). CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 98TH CONG.,
IST SESS., POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
SPACE 46 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as Committee Print]. At least
three of these companies have considered developing launch capability. Id.
:1 Although SSI used a Minuteman I motor provided by NASA to propel the
Conestoga, it purchased the unit and did not receive any free service in the instal-
lation of the booster. See MISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 6; Space Commerciali-
zation Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications of the House Comm.
on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1983) (statement of David
Hannah, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Space Services of America) (NASA provided
SSI with the rocket motor for use in the Conestoga) [hereinafter cited as Commer-
cialization Hearings]. The purchase of the rocket engine received the approval of
numerous NASA officials as well as representatives of the House and Senate. Let-
ter from James V. Carroll to John H. Cassady, FAA, July 15, 1982 [hereinafter
cited as Supplement Letter].
Other business ventures, however, have considered and proposed joint ven-
tures with NASA. Arguably, NASA should not engage in such activities, as it is a
research and development agency, not a quasi-corporation that seeks a profit like
Commercial Satellite Corporation ("COMSAT"). See generally Commercialization
Hearings, supra, at 61 (statement of Hannah) (discussing NASA's role in commer-
cialization); see Butler, Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, April 11,
1983, reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. E1599, E1600 (daily ed. April 14, 1983) (NASA
Charter limits activities to research and development, not operations; legitimate
mission is to advance research and develop knowledge base). Indeed the SSI ac-
quisition of a booster was not actually a commercial "purchase," at least not in the
strict sense of the word. At all times the motor technically belonged to NASA-
SSI simply had the right to use the rocket engine for a launch. Because the
booster was useless after the launch, SSI had to compensate NASA for the "dam-
age" caused by its use. This creative approach to the "sale" avoided the other-
wise difficult procedure of procurement from a government agency.
Most agree that the government should not subsidize the private ELV industry.
See Commercialization Hearings, supra, at 150 (statement of Herbert A. Reynolds,
Deputy Director, Intelligence and Space Policy; Deputy Under-Secretary of De-
fense, Policy) (interagency group agrees United States should not subsidize indus-
try); id. at 213 (statement of Dr. Klaus Heiss, former President, The Space
Transportation Co., Inc.) (government subsidization not required for commercial
ELV's).
In addition, most agree that special tax considerations are not necessary to stim-
ulate private industry in space. See id. at 18 (statement of Mitchell Rogovine)
(space industry no different from other American industries with respect to tax);
id. at 72-73 (statement of Hannah) (commercial operations need no special tax
incentive).
" Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 64 (statement of Hannah).
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Another company, Starstruck, on February 6, 1984, at-
tempted to become the second private enterprise to put a
rocket into sub-orbital flight.5 Starstruck intended to
launch the Dolphin, a privately developed ELV, into space
from a platform in international waters off the coast of
California but was thwarted by a small engine fire.6 The
company again attempted to lauch the Dolphin on March
31, 1984. 7 Although this attempt was aborted when a
water leak shorted out the rocket's electrical system, Star-
struck plans to continue its launch efforts.8
Other private firms orjoint ventures are developing ex-
pendable vehicle launch capability and are actively pursu-
ing clients and a position in the marketplace. 9 Several
companies have developed upper stage vehicles designed
to place payloads in high orbit. 10 Other private groups are
devising new technologies, including launches of reusable
manned vehicles from modified 747's and single stage
manned rockets that could transport payloads to high
5 Starstruck had obtained the necessary approvals and was scheduled to launch
from its ocean platform on February 6, 1984. The company threw the rocket
overboard, however, when nitrogen leaked and a fire developed. Dolphin at Sea,
Private Launcher Catches Fire, Thrown Overboard, Satellite Week, Feb. 20, 1984, 6
[hereinafter cited as Dolphin Launch]. Starstruck formerly was known as ARC
Technology.
I, d. The fire occurred when workers attempted to repair a nitrogen leak that
apparently resulted from the land transport of the space vehicle to its port of
departure. Id. The workers threw the rocket into the ocean to put out the fire and
then retrieved it for reconditioning. Id.
Starstruck to Continue Dolphin Tests, J. COM., Apr. 11, 1984, at 2a.
" Id.
See also Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 232 (statement of James C.
Bennett, Vice President for Government Affairs, ARC Technologies) (discussing
launch plans). See generally Committee Print, supra note 2, at 45-52. (discussing
private space ventures). Three producers of ELV's are actively marketing their
wares, while a fourth manufacturer has the same potential. See id. at 46-47; see also
note 2 supra (describing existing ELV's). In addition to the Conestoga and the
Dolphin, a third corporation, Satellite Propulsion, Inc., is independently develop-
ing its own ELV, the Liberty. Committee Print, supra note 2, at 47. Consequently,
there are no fewer than seven companies that are potential competitors in the
ELV industry.
- Both McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics currently manufacture up-
per stage vehicles called the Payload Assist Module and the Centaur, respectively.
Committee Print, supra note 2, at 47. Two other companies, Boeing and Orbital
Systems Corp., are currently developing similar upper stage vehicles. Id.
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orbits and even to the moon." Finally, at least two firms
have entered into negotiations to buy and operate a fifth
space shuttle. 12
Thus, there is little doubt that private enterprise is
ready and willing to leap into the space transportation
business-an industry with a potential market of $10 bil-
lion over the next ten years.' 3 As with most technologies
on the horizon, however, private launch corporations
face a potential brick wall-government regulation.'
4
Prior to the Conestoga, all launches from the United
States were conducted by NASA, which operates under its
own rulings and guidelines.' 5 Consequently, there are no
,, See id. at 48-49 (discussing plans of Transpace Inc. to offer to Space Van and
of Pacific American Launch Systems to develop the Phoenix). For those who think
that the idea of private enterprise going to the moon is overly ambitious or ab-
surd, the dramatic growth of the airline industry in the 1920's and 1930's despite
similar doubts should serve as convincing proof of the ability of American busi-
nesses to apply existing technology to serve commercial interests. In this context,
one commentator has argued that the "history of air travel and telecommunica-
tions demonstrates clearly that the private sector will enter the most sophisticated
fields and bring services to the public that had been unimaginable a few years
earlier. America's future in space will be no different .... " Butler, supra note 3,
at E1600. Moreover, it is likely that the organizers of the Conestoga launch ini-
tially encountered many disbelievers who charged that private launches would not
occur in this century. On the contrary, a viable ELV industry now exists and is
realistically planning to expand to reusable, long flight rockets*
"- See Private Shuttle Operation "Not Realistic" Says Heiss, J. CoM., June 11, 1984, at
2a. Astrotech International Corp. recently proposed to buy the fifth shuttle for $2
billion. Id. Space Transportation Co., partially owned by Prudential Insurance
and Federal Express, offered to purchase a fifth shuttle in 1982, and negotiations
with NASA were still underway as of May, 1983. See Committee Print, supra note
2, at 51; Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 128-29 (statement of Lt. Gen-
eral James A. Abrahamson, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA) (dis-
cussing status of negotiations between NASA and Space Transportation Co.).
1:1 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 202 (statement of Allan
McArtor, President and Chief Operating Officer of Space Transportation Co.,
Inc.); Murdock, Certification of Aircraft and Aerospace Vehicles, FIRST ABA FORUM ON
AIR AND SPACE LAW, at 12 (1984).
,1 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 179, 180 (statement of Gary
Flora, Director of Commercial Titan at Martin Marrieta) (government authoriza-
tion stands in way of commercialization of space as a whole, including Titan: gov-
ernment approval most important right now); Butler, supra note 3, at E1599
(asserting there is danger that "federal government will suffocate space entrepre-
neurs with red tape .... ").
i, See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1201-1202
(1983).
There is little concern that the entry of private enterprise into the space payload
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regulations specifically designed to apply to private
launches and no single central agency to promulgate reg-
ulations.' 6 Rather, various government agencies with rel-
evant interests to protect have interjected a hodgepodge
of uncoordinated licenses and legal requirements that
make private launchings a procedural nightmare. 7
I. UNITED STATES POLICY ON PRIVATE ELV LAUNCHES
An unstructured regulatory system exists despite the of-
ficial national space policy, supporting, inter alia, the ex-
pansion of the "private-sector investment and
involvement in civil space and space related activities."' 8
delivery market will conflict with the operation of NASA's space shuttle program.
Private expendable vehicle launches will not compete with the shuttle. See Commer-
cialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 22 (statement of Philip M. Klutznick, Chairman,
National Academy of Public Administration Panel on Encouraging Business Ven-
tures in Space Technologies) (NASA phasing out ELV's; private ELV's will com-
pete with Ariane, not shuttle); id. at 37-38 (statement of James M. Beggs,
Administrator, NASA) (shuttle will capture most of market in long term). But see
id. at 87 (Ordahl, Director of Space Programs, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics)
(suggesting ELV's will compete with shuttle). Rather the private ELV industry
will complement and supplement the shuttle fleet. See Commercialization Hearings,
supra note 3, at 64, 75 (statement of Hannah); id. at 130 (statement of Abraham-
son); id. at 174-75 (statement of Flora). Private ELV's will offer not an alternative
but an overflow or backup capacity in cases in which a shuttle launch is delayed for
technical or other reasons, or in periods of high demand. Indeed, the participa-
tion of private enterprise in space activities is crucial to the continued lead of the
United States in space. Id. at 4 (statement of Klutznick).
", See Myers, Federal Government Regulation of Commercial Operations Using Expenda-
ble Launch Vehicles, FIRST ABA FORUM ON AIR AND SPACE LAw, at 2 (1984) (no sin-
gle regulatory agency or comprehensive framework governing private space
activities); see infra notes 39-112 and accompanying text (discussing various agen-
cies with regulatory concerns).
11 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 48 (statement of Beggs) (regula-
tory process is "chaotic"); Murdock, supra note 13, at 12 (referring to existing
"neanderthal regulatory approach"); Myers, supra note 16, at 2 (many agencies
and institutions influence approvals process; adverse decisions from any of these
has potential for halting any rocket launch); 128 CONG. REC. E5376 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 1982) (statement of Rep. Akaka) (approval process "complicated"; requires
"inordinate amount of time and money"). This article addresses the more signifi-
cant licenses and legal requirements imposed by federal agencies. See infra notes
39-112 and accompanying text (discussing significant participants in the regula-
tory non-structure).
1" United States Space Policy, Administration of President Reagan, 18 WEEKLY
COMP, PRES. Doc. 872 (July 4, 1982) (Presidential Directive/NSC-42). On Octo-
ber 31, 1984, as this article was going to print, the President signed legislation
6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [50
In 1982, the President announced that the United States
would encourage domestic commercial exploitation of
space but indicated that such activities "must be consis-
tent with national security concerns, treaties, and interna-
tional agreements."' 9 Thus, the government announced
that it would authorize and regulate private space activi-
ties to the extent required by treaty and by national
security.20
Beyond the original general policy statement, the gov-
ernment has evinced a willingness to limit the regulation
of private launch vehicles to that required "to meet .. .
national and international obligations and to ensure pub-
lic safety." '2 1 Moreover, the government fully supports
the commercialization of ELV's and will encourage the
use of government launch ranges by private enterprise.2 2
Although the United States will not subsidize the indus-
try, it will price its facilities, services, and equipment with
the policy of expansion in mind.23
Such a minimal regulation policy is crucial to the devel-
opment of an infant industry like expendable launch vehi-
cles. If faced with excessive regulation or a burdensome
licensing procedure, private enterprise would not take on
the risks inherent in space transportation, and a poten-
tially competitive and beneficial industry would be still-
born.24 Indeed, some maintain that the cumbersome
designed to consolidate regulatory control over ELV's in the Department of
Transportation. Although this article does not discuss the new law in depth, it
does address the premature nature of the legislation. See infra note 229 (discuss-
ing H.R. 3942).
It d. at 873.
,2 Id.
' Expendable Launch Vehicles, Announcement of United States Government
Support for Commercial Operations by the Private Sector, Administration of
President Reagan, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 721, 722 (May 16, 1983) [herein-
after cited as Policy Statement].
22 Id. at 722.
2:1 See id.
2- See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 49 (statement of Beggs) (must
not overburden industry with restrictions so that it fears entering the market;
need assurance that substantial investment can go forward); Murdock, supra note
13, at 12 ("neanderthal" regulatory approach could stifle ELV industry).
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approval process has already inhibited substantial invest-
ment in ELV's. 25 Moreover, the ELV industry is rapidly
growing in other parts of the world, and the government
must not stand in the way of private enterprise if the
United States is to remain competitive in the launch serv-
ices marketplace.26
To implement this prodevelopment policy, the Presi-
dent first established an inter-agency group, formed and
co-chaired by NASA and the Department of State, to
streamline existing licensing procedures, to develop and
coordinate new licensing and regulatory procedures, to
apply to routine launches from commercial ranges, and to
recommend an appropriate lead agency.27 After several
months the President designated the Department of
Transportation (DOT) as the lead agency with the respon-
sibility of fostering commercial use of expendable launch
vehicles.28 The Secretary of Transportation indicated that
the directive included the creation of a new office within
the DOT to head an inter-agency task force on expenda-
ble launch vehicles. 29 Among the agencies that are partic-
ipating in the regulatory process are the FCC, the State
Department, the Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), NASA, the Department of Defense
and the Commerce Department.3 0 The DOT's role is not
2. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Eliza-
beth H. Dole, Secretary of Transportation) [hereinafter cited as ELV Hearings].
26 China, India, Japan, and the European countries all have plans to launch ve-
hicle services, and the Soviet Union has shown some interest in entering the mar-
ket. Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 103 (statement of Akaka); see id. at
108-11 (discussing space efforts of other countries).
21 See ELV Hearings, supra note 25, at 3. The interagency group produced a se-
ries of three reports, only one of which the National Security Council would re-
lease. See REPORT ON U. S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND PROCESS FOR
HANDLING U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH OPERATIONS, Sept. 15, 1983 [herein-
after cited as SIG REPORT].
-2 DOT Will Be Lead Agency for Expendable Launch Vehicles in Space, De-
partment of Transportation News, DOT 98-83 (Nov. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as DOT Press Release].
2 EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES IN SPACE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FACT SHEET (Nov. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as DOT FACT SHEET].
." DOT Press Release, supra note 28, at 2.
1984]
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to add new regulations to the list already required but to
"streamline government procedures applicable to private
sector launch activities" and devise a " 'one-stop shop-
ping' system for launch approvals."'" On February 14,
1984, the President signed an Executive Order that offi-
cially established the DOT as the lead agency for pur-
poses of private launch regulation and set forth the
particular functions that the Department is to serve. 2
This article addresses the proper implementation of the
existing free enterprise policy.3 3 A review of the existing
regulatory non-structure reveals that, although no agency
or department has direct regulatory authority over all as-
pects of private rocket launches, many have interests to
protect and thus assert jurisdiction using regulations
promulgated for other purposes wholly unrelated to the
launching of space vehicles. An in depth examination of
the experiences of SSI and Starstruck in wading through
the duplicative prerequisites to the private launch of a
space vehicle demonstrates the need for a more coordi-
nated regulatory process. This article, after establishing
that need, analyzes the effect of international and domes-
tic law on the regulation of private expendable launch ve-
hicles 4.3  The article then evaluates the various candidates
for the lead agency position3 5 and determines that a spe-
cialized space agency under the wing of the DOT could
best lead the regulatory process 6.3  Further, this article
discusses the appropriate structure of the regulatory
agency and the functions that the agency should perform
with respect to the development of an expendable launch
1' DOT FACT SHEET, supra note 29, at 2.
.12 Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (1984) (on commercial expenda-
ble launch vehicle activities) [hereinafter cited as ELV Executive Order].
. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (discussing free enterprise pol-
icy of the United States).
" See infra notes 203-258 and accompanying text (discussing effect of interna-
tional and national law on regulation of private ELV's).
.r See infra notes 259-283 and accompanying text (evaluating candidates for
lead agency position).
' See infra note 262 and accompanying text (asserting DOT best choice for reg-
ulating ELV's).
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vehicle industry in the United States.3 ' Additionally, the
article discusses the potentially conflicting need to protect
the public from potential harm and the desire to en-
courage private industry by minimizing the regulation of
private launches. Finally, the article outlines some of the
substantive regulations and procedures appropriate for
adoption by the space agency. 8
II. EXISTING REGULATORY NON-STRUCTURE
A. Federal Aviation Administration Regulation
The FAA is the only agency to which Congress has dele-
gated any direct jurisdiction over any aspect of private
rocket launches. The Federal Aviation Act of 195839 au-
thorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue, through
the FAA, rules and regulations "[for the prevention of
collision[s] between aircraft . . .and airborne objects."4 °
The statute does not explicitly mention spacecraft or
rockets. Nonetheless, the legislative history of the FAA
statute clearly indicates that Congress intended to subject
launch vehicles to FAA jurisdiction, at least to some ex-
tent.4 ' Moreover, although the Act does not distinguish
between spacecraft and aircraft, the FAA has recognized
17 See infra notes 284-312 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate ELV
regulatory structures and functions).
-' See infra notes 313-352 and accompanying text (discussing particular regula-
tions and procedures appropriate for ELV regulatory authority).
.- 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1523 (1982).
4 Id. § 1348(c).
41 See Murdock, supra note 13, at 12-13. Commenting on the scope of the FAA's
jurisdiction, the Senate Committee explained that:
[i]n order for the administrator of the new agency to properly dis-
charge his responsibilities under the new act, particularly those in
connection with the allocation of airspace, that his jurisdiction
should extend not only to vehicles commonly considered as aircraft,
but also during their flight through airspace, other vehicles such as
rockets, missiles and other airborne objects.
S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1958) (emphasis added). In this re-
gard Congress broadened section 101 (5) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(5) (1976 &
Supp. V 1980), "since all vehicles, rockets and missiles, as well as aircraft, are in fact
used at least in part for navigation of the airspace. " S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1958) (emphasis added). The FAA does not have jurisdiction over
ELV's used by NASA or by the Department of Defense because Congress ex-
19841
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this distinction and has addressed the flight of rockets
through airspace in its rules and regulations.42 The FAA's
exemption of the Space Transportation System (shuttle)
from the coverage of the Act is further evidence of the
FAA's understanding of the difference between aircraft
and spacecraft.43
The FAA regulations (FAR's) define a rocket as "an air-
craft propelled by ejected expanding gases generated in
the engine from self-contained propellants and not de-
pendent on the intake of outside substances. ' 44 The defi-
nition also includes any part of an aircraft that becomes
separated from the vehicle during its operation. 45 The
regulations provide that no person may operate such an
unmanned rocket unless the operator gives certain safety
related information to the nearest FAA Air Traffic Con-
trol facility within twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to
the launch.46 The FAR's also provide that no person may
operate an unmanned rocket:
(a) in a manner that creates a collision hazard with other
aircraft;
(b) in controlled air space;
(c) within five miles of the boundary of any airport;
(d) at any altitude where clouds or obscuring phenomena
of more than five-tenths coverage prevails;
empted public aircraft from the FAA's regulatory powers. See Murdock, supra note
13, at 13.
42 Dula, Regulation of Private Commercial Space Activities, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FOURTH COLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 25, at 25 (1981).
- Mossinghoff & Sloup, Legal Issues Inherent in Space Shuttle Operations, 6J. SPACE
L. 47, 65-66 (1978).
44 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1984).
45 Id.
46 Id. § 101.25. The required data includes:
(a) the names and addresses of the operators;
(b) the number of rockets to be operated;
(c) the size and weight of each rocket;
(d) the maximum altitude to which each rocket will be operated;
(e) the location of the operation;
(f) the date, time, and duration of the operation;
(g) any other pertinent information required by the air traffic con-
trol facility.
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(e) at any altitude where the horizontal visibility is less
than five miles;
(f) into any cloud;
(g) within 1,500 feet of any person or property that is not
associated with the operation;
(h) between sunset and sunrise.
Although these regulations are purportedly aimed at
rockets, they were not established with private commer-
cial launches in mind.48 Rather, the FAA prescribed the
regulations "primarily for model rocket enthusiasts. '49
Because the FAA rules were not tailored to the concerns
of expendable vehicle launches, no meaningful FAA regu-
lations exist to control such launches.50 Moreover,
although the FAA generally requires aircraft registration
and air-worthiness certificates for aircraft and aircraft en-
gines, 51 no similar regulations with respect to unmanned
rockets exist.5 2 The FAA has thus recognized that FAR
Part 101, Subpart C, 53 albeit insufficient, constitutes the
only FAA regulation that applies to private expendable
47 Id. at § 101.23.
48 The limitations imposed by section 101.23 were proposed in 1962, 27 Fed.
Reg. 5402 (1962), enacted in 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 306 (1963), recodified in 1963,
28 Fed. Reg. 6722 (1963), and amended in 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 22, 252 (1974).
Consequently, at the time it enacted the regulations, the FAA did not even con-
template the possibility of private commercial launches by a private ELV industry.
See Petition of Space Services, Inc., For Exemption Before the Federal Aviation
Administration, Docket No. 22,775 (March 16, 1982), at 9-10 (summary notice in
47 Fed. Reg. 16,243 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
49 Memorandum Re Contacts with the FAA from Arthur M. Dula to David Ross
(July 17, 1981), at 3 [hereinafter cited as FAA Contact Memo]. The FAA explicitly
indicated that it proposed the regulations governing unmanned rockets to regu-
late the "steadily increasing" activity in "experimental amateur rocketry." 27 Fed.
Reg. 5402, 5403 (1962). The FAA apparently distinguished between "model
rockets" and "experimental amateur rocketry." Id.
5o See Memorandum Re Exemption from FAA Regulations from James R. Myers
to Space Services Government Regulation File (Aug. 28, 1981), at 2 [hereinafter
cited as FAA Regulation Memo] (FAA regulations cumbersome and ill-suited to
regulate ELV's).
5' See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21-39, 47 (1984).
5 FAA Regulation Memo, supra note 50, at 1; see Murdock, supra note 13, at 13
(FAA declined to require that Conestoga I be certificated, registered, or otherwise
controlled).
5 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.21-.25 (1984).
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vehicle launches.54
In any event, to obtain the FAA's clearance for a launch,
a company must secure either a waiver of, or an exemp-
tion from the regulations.5 5 A waiver permits a company
to conduct a one-time test-flight from the specified launch
facility.56 An exemption, on the other hand, represents a
determination by the FAA that the proposed activity is not
governed by the FAA regulations.57 An exemption is thus
much broader than a waiver and is preferable when the
company plans to conduct more than one flight from a
particular facility. 58 Moreover, the FAA has indicated that
an exemption, rather than a waiver, will be required when
the rocket will fly into controlled airspace or outside of
United States territory.59 Rocket launches from govern-
5 See Petition, supra note 48, at 8 (informal conversations with FAA suggest
FAA regards Part 101, Subpart C as exclusive FAR's governing unmanned
rocket); Mission Report, supra note 1, at 6; Myers, supra note 16, at 3. Because the
FAA did not mention any other regulations when it exempted the Conestoga I
launch, the FAA apparently determined that no other FAA regulations were appli-
cable to private launches. In re Space Services, Inc., Regulating Doc. No. 227775
(September 1, 1982).
Because the FAA requires notice of construction, alteration, and activation of
airports, 14 C.F.R. § 157 (1984), and a launch site could be considered an airport
under the FAR's, see 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1984), it is possible that the FAA might
regulate launch sites like airports. Apparently the FAA has not adopted this view.
-. See FAA Contact Memo, supra note 49, at 1 (SSI must obtain either waiver or
exemption if Percheron enters controlled airspace). Because a rocket is almost
certain to enter controlled airspace, roughly 14,500 feet in altitude, all private
launches will require either a waiver or an exemption of some kind. Id. at 2 (Per-
cheron almost certain to fly into controlled airspace); Myers, supra note 16, at 4
(sub-orbital or orbital rocket launched from United States invariably enters con-
trolled airspace requiring waiver or exemption).
.- FAA Contact Memo, supra note 49, at 2. It appears that a company may ob-
tain a waiver from a regional FAA office as long as the flight will not go beyond
the territorial waters of the United States. Id. Otherwise, the waiver would have
to be processed in Washington, D.C. because the State Department must review a
launch plan that goes beyond the United States territorial waters before the FAA
may grant a waiver. Id.
.57 Id. at 3. An exemption can only be granted in Washington, D.C. and the FAA
must consult with and obtain comments from the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and any other agencies that have a jurisdictional interest in
or use the air space. Id. at 2.
." Id. at 2 (exemption desirable if more than one launch planned from same or
different site).
.11, See Petition, supra note 48, at 10 (should file for exemption if launch extends
outside United States territory or above 14,500 feet).
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ment facilities, however, do not require a waiver of, or an
exemption from the FAA regulations because the airspace
above government rocket ranges is restricted. 60  Rather,
such launches are subject to the jurisdiction of the gov-
ernment agency that operates the range.6 '
B. Interests of the Department of State in Private ELV's
Although the State Department has no direct regulatory
authority over private rocket launches, it has certain inter-
ests to protect. First, the Department of State, as the
agency of the executive branch charged with handling for-
eign affairs, must ensure that the United States complies
with its various international obligations.6 2 As discussed
below, the space treaties make the launching state respon-
sible under international law for private space activities of
its nationals and liable for any accidents caused by its
launch vehicles.63 Consequently, the State Department
must review proposed private launches to prevent poten-
tial United States liability to foreign countries and to en-
sure launch safety. In this regard, the Department of
State may require the launching company to obtain insur-
ance or otherwise agree to indemnify the United States
for any liability resulting from its treaty obligations.64
The Department of State is also concerned with
launches that involve an "export" under the Arms Export
"0 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 73.11-.19, 73.81-.85 (1984).
I" See Myers, supra note 16, at 4, 6-7; infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text
(NASA has jurisdiction when private company uses NASA facilities); infra note
104 and accompanying text (Department of Defense has jurisdiction over
launches from its facilities).
62 See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 20 (Department of State ultimately in
charge of adherence to treaty obligations); see also Myers, supra note 16, at 7 (State
Department responsible for negotiating, executing, and ensuring compliance with
treaties).
( See infra notes 203-221 and accompanying text (discussing international
treaty obligations of United States).
l' Each of the private companies which launched a rocket obtained such insur-
ance at the request of the Department of State. See infra note 182 and accompany-
ing text (discussing SSI's launch insurance); see also infra note 195 and
accompanying text (discussing Starstruck's launch insurance requirement).
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Control Act. 65 The State Department designates certain
defense articles, services, and technical data that may be
exported from the United States only with a license issued
under the Act and its accompanying regulations. 66 In-
cluded on this "Munitions List" are rockets, launch vehi-
cles, payloads, specifically designated associated
equipment, and related technical data.67 In addition, the
term export refers to "the sending or taking out of the
United States in any manner any article, equipment or
technical data on the Munitions List."' 68 Therefore, when-
ever a rocket launched from United States territory travels
beyond the three mile territorial waters of the United
States, it is considered an export. 69  The State Depart-
ment employs this construction even though it clearly did
not promulgate the regulations with rocket launches in
mind.y7
The launch of a rocket thus constitutes an export be-
cause the rocket leaves the United States' jurisdiction and
enters international waters. When a proposed flight plan
calls for the rocket to land within the territorial waters of
the United States, however, no export occurs and the
State Department's regulations do no apply to the
launch.7' Similarly, when a United States company
launches a rocket from beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States-from international waters or another
- 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see generally id. §§ 2751-2796. The
State Department has promulgated regulations concerning rockets and launch ve-
hicles. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1984).
,;,i SIG REPORT, supra note 27; see International Traffic in Arms, 22 C.F.R.
§§ 121-130 (1984).
67 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1984).
om 22 C.F.R. § 121.19 (1984).
w. See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Space Science and Applications of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, to Review H.R. 3942, The Expendable Launch Vehicle
Commercialization Act, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 76 (1984) (discussion between Rep-
resentative Volkmer and Otho Eskin, Department of State) [hereinafter cited as
1984 Hearings].
70 See id. The regulations were originally issued before rocket flight became a
reality. Id.
71 See FAA Contact Memo, supra note 49, at 2 (waiver may be granted without
State Department review if flight less than three miles); see also infra note 115 (no
State Department review required because splashdown within territorial waters).
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country-no export occurs and the State Department has
less apparent interest in the launch. In the latter case, the
State Department nonetheless may exercise some export
control over the transport of the rocket from the United
States to its launch site and may indeed be the only
United States agency with any direct jurisdiction over the
launch.72
C. NASA's Regulatory Authority
NASA clearly has knowledge, expertise, and experience
that is relevant to private ELV's. 73  It is less clear, how-
ever, whether NASA has any regulatory authority over
private launches or whether NASA even has any institu-
tional concern with respect to nongovernment activities. 4
In any event, however, it appears that NASA has no desire
to function as a regulator of private ELV's.75
As a general matter, there appears to be no authority
that gives NASA a role in the commercialization of
space.76 The National Aeronautics and Space Act of
72 This is apparently the case with respect to the recent launch by Starstruck,
which planned to transport its rocket from the United States to the high seas for
launch. That company indicated that in seeking approval for its launch it was
"under the basic jurisdiction of the Department of State," rather than the FAA.
Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 233, 241 (statement of Bennett); see also
id. at 245-46 (State Department temporary export permit is primary governing
document for launch from international waters). Bennett stated that the company
was seeking a temporary export permit from the Office of Munitions Control. Id.
at 233. The application was referred to NASA, the FAA, and the Department of
Defense. Id. The company also obtained a permit from the FCC. Moreover, the
Department of State required the company to acquire insurance indemnifying the
United States. Id. at 241.
73 See Myers, supra note 16, at 5 (NASA has more technical expertise concerning
launch vehicles and spacecraft than any other agency, except possibly the Depart-
ment of Defense).
74 See id. (although NASA has no direct authority over private ELV's, NASA's
statutory authority arguably covers private space activities). At least one commen-
tator has expressed the possibility that NASA could attempt to assert its jurisdic-
tion over private ELV's launched from the United States. See Dula, supra note 42,
at 26; see also Committee Print, supra note 2, at 33 (arguing NASA Act covers pri-
vate launches).
15 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 36 (statement of Beggs) (NASA
does not want to be in the regulatory business); Myers, supra note 16, at 5 (NASA
has no "interest, responsibility or authority" to regulate private ELV's).
16 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 19. (statement of Klutznick).
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195877 (Act) governs the United States government's civil
space activities. The Act delegates to a civilian agency,
NASA, responsibility for all "aeronautic and space activi-
ties sponsored by the United States . ,,78 The Act de-
fines aeronautical and space activities as "the
development, construction, testing and operation for re-
search purposes of aeronautical and space vehicles, and such
other activities as may be required for the exploration of
space."79 Moreover, the Act describes a space vehicle as
"an object intended for launch, launched, or assembled in
outer space, including the Space Shuttle ....
While private ELV's would clearly fall within NASA's
definition of a space vehicle, the language highlighted
above strongly suggests that Congress did not intend for
NASA to regulate private rocket launches. First, the
United States does not sponsor a private launch, particularly
if the enterprise does not utilize the government's facili-
ties or services. When a company designs and builds its
own space vehicle, launches the rocket from its own facili-
ties, and conducts its own tracking and recovery, the gov-
ernment has extended no benefit to the enterprise, and
the government has not endorsed, promoted, or other-
wise sponsored that particular activity. Consequently, the
launch is not within the jurisdiction of the Act. Even if the
government provided launch facilities or a particular part
of the rocket 8' the United States does not thereby sponsor
the launch. The Supreme Court has indicated that even a
grant of federal funds does not necessarily constitute
sponsorship of the recipient's activities.82 Certainly a
mere contractual arrangement to provide launch facilities,
" 72 Stat. 426 (1958) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2477, 2481-2485
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
78 Id. § 2451 (emphasis added).
79 Id. § 2452 (emphasis added).
81 Id.
It For instance, NASA sold to SSI the engine used to propel the Conestoga I.
See supra note 3 (discussing NASA's sale of a booster to SSI). Arguably, this rela-
tionship constitutes "sponsorship."
S2 Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179 (1980); see Dula, supra note 42, at 27
(discussing the sponsorship issue and Forsham).
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like a federal grant, should not "convert the acts of the
recipient from private acts to governmental acts absent
extensive, detailed and virtually day-to-day
supervision.83
One might also argue that the treaty obligations of the
United States that place responsibility for private launches
on the launching state84 amount to sponsorship of the ac-
tivity. While it is plausible that Congress sought to man-
date some regulatory process by giving its advice and
consent to the international space treaties, it is unlikely
that Congress intended to extend the reach of the NASA
Act to private launches. Moreover, the space treaties
merely contemplate international liability of the launching
state.85 The United States incurs no liability for damage
that occurs domestically as a result of being party to the
space treaties.8 6 Consequently, while the United States
may "sponsor" launches for purposes of the liability con-
vention, as a domestic matter the mere regulation of
ELV's does not constitute sponsorship. If such were the
case, the United States government would be a sponsor of
virtually every commercial activity in the United States-
an absurd notion.
Even if a private ELV is determined to be sponsored by
the United States government, it is apparent that such ac-
tivity would not be "for research purposes" or "for the
8. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 179.
84 See Dula, supra note 42, at 27-28 (arguing acceptance of treaty obligations
amounts to sponsorship).
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, pro-
vides that a launching state is absolutely liable to compensate for damage caused
by its space object on the surface or to aircraft in flight. Id. art. 2. Because the
term "launching state" includes a state from whose territory or facility a space
object is launched, id. art. 1(c), the United States government would be liable to
other states for damages caused by private space vehicles launched from the
United States or its territorial waters. See Dula, supra note 42, at 28; see also infra
notes 203-221 and accompanying text (discussing space treaties and United States
obligations thereunder).
8- See infra notes 217-225 and accompanying text (distinguishing between na-
tional and international liability).
" See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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exploration of space" as required by the Act.8 7 Private
enterprise is more interested in the application of tech-
nology to earn a profit than in making large expenditures
on research and development.8 8 Moreover, few, if any,
private companies plan in the near future to launch space
vehicles for mere explorative purposes. Exploration of
space is not a profitable venture at this point in time, and
no gratuitous contributors have surfaced to volunteer
such private unprofitable missions. Any exploration or
research and development that private industry under-
takes will likely be incidental to other objectives or part of
a long range profit-making project. In any event, the
main functions of the industry will not fall within the juris-
diction of NASA, and no regulatory power is thus con-
ferred on NASA by the Act.
Finally, if NASA has jurisdiction over private ELV's, no
other agency's claim of jurisdiction would be appropriate.
When NASA launches a rocket it has exclusive control
over all aspects of the launch-safety, communications,
timing, location, environmental impact, and the like. No
other agencies assert regulatory authority over NASA
launches. Even the FAA gave up any potential jurisdic-
tion it may otherwise have held over the shuttle as an air-
plane.89 Certainly if NASA has jurisdiction over private
launches by virtue of the same legislation and language
that confers its jurisdiction over United States govern-
ment launches, the scope and nature of the authority
should be the same. NASA would have the same exclu-
sive jurisdiction over private launches as it has over its
own launches. Such a conclusion, however, is inconsis-
tent with the brief regulatory experience of the last two
s, See 42 U.S.C. § 2452 (1983).
88 Certainly private companies conduct and will continue to conduct research
and development activities (R & D) with respect to ELV's. Such R & D, however,
is incidental to the profit motive, and does not alter the nature of the business to
the traditional R & D role of NASA itself. See Commercialization Hearings, supra note
3, at 45 (statement of Walker) (NASA is primarily a research and development
agency).
89 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (FAA exempted shuttle from FAA
regulations).
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years 90 and contrary to the policy of the current adminis-
tration, which apparently recognizes the competent juris-
diction of several agencies over private ELV's. 9'
Consequently, NASA has no claim to jurisdiction over pri-
vate ELV's, and its interest in participating in the regula-
tory process is due solely to its technical expertise and
experience.92
Rather than exercising direct jurisdiction over certain
aspects of private ELV's, NASA has participated in the
regulatory process indirectly through the FAA and other
regulatory bodies. 93 Because the licensing agencies gen-
erally lack the technical expertise necessary to approve
rocket launch plans, they rely on NASA to perform the
technical review of private launch plans.94 Thus, in order
to ascertain whether a particular launch or design will be
safe, the FAA may require the applicant to obtain NASA's
approval of the relevant technical aspects as a precondi-
tion to an exemption or waiver from the FAA
regulations.95
See infra notes 113-199 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory experi-
ence of SSI and Starstruck).
91 The current administration's policy contemplates that several federal agen-
cies will exercise jurisdiction over private rocket launches. See DOT Press Re-
lease, supra note 28.
' NASA nonetheless apparently claims some jurisdiction over private space ac-
tivities. NASA interprets international and domestic law as mandating its authori-
zation and continual supervision of the activities of United States companies in
space, regardless of whether the rocket is launched from the United States. See
Dula, Space Law for Business Planners, 7J. CONTEMP. BUS. 113, 121 (1978). Despite
this fact, however, NASA has not asserted exclusive control over the previous pri-
vate ELV's and has indicated no intent to expand its role. Moreover, NASA is not
well-suited as a regulatory body and has no mandate from Congress to regulate.
NASA can properly play a role in the regulatory scheme by putting to use its
technical expertise and experience to draft safety guidelines, etc.
' See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 129 (statement of Abrahamson)
(NASA has served as advisor to FAA, FCC and Department of State on technical
characteristics of private launches); Myers, supra note 16, at 5 (NASA will play an
important role in factual and technical questions). NASA has reviewed the plans
of both SSI and Starstruck, although it was not directly involved in the regulation
of either. Id. at 6. The regulating agencies relied on NASA's recommendations
regarding the technical aspects of the launches because the licensing agencies
lacked any technical competence. Id.
'9 Myers, supra note 16, at 6.
,5 See supra note 93 (discussing NASA's role in the regulatory process).
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Moreover, NASA may exercise some authority over a
private company that contracts to use NASA equipment
or facilities.96 For instance, NASA may require a company
wishing to use NASA launching facilities to obtain third-
party liability insurance to protect the United States from
any liability.97 NASA may also require such a private com-
pany to restrict the unauthorized publication or use of
certain information,98 or require disclosure to the public
of certain aspects of the launch that bear on the public
welfare. 99 NASA did assert some direct authority over the
Conestoga I launch because NASA sold the booster en-
gine used in that launch to SSI.' 00
D. Department of Defense
The interest of the Department of Defense in private
ELV's is to protect the national security interests of the
United States.10 ' Nonetheless, it appears that this objec-
tive may be accomplished through the export license re-
quirement or through the involvement of other agencies
in the regulatory process.' 0 2 The Department of Defense
has indicated that it envisions no role for itself in regulat-
ing private launches that do not make use of Department
96 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1204.1000-.1003 (1984); Dula, supra note 42, at 30 (NASA
may append certain conditions to authorization to use of NASA's tracking or
launching facilities); Myers, supra note 16, at 6-7 (NASA will regulate many aspects
of private ELV activities in its role as a lessor of facilities).
97 See Mossinghoff, Managing Tort Liability Risks in the Era of the Space Shuttle, 7 J.
SPACE L. 121, 122 (1979) (NASA's policy to require insurance).
- See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1203.400, 1206.300 (1984) (restrictions on certain
information).
:" See Dula, supra note 92, at 121.
o See MissIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. NASA assessed the technical and
safety aspects of the launch prior to approving the sale of the booster. In addi-
tion, the sales agreement required SSI to purchase flight insurance to indemnify
the United States. Id. See also Myers, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing NASA's careful
review of the technical and safety aspects of the Conestoga I launch).
,0, See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 21 (discussing Department of Defense
and national security); Ross, The Department of Transportation's New Role in Commer-
cializing Space Transportation, FIRST ABA FORUM ON AIR AND SPACE LAw 5 (1984)
(military and intelligence applications of launch must be considered).
102 See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 21 (suggesting that a neutral agency
should be responsible for resolving national security interests because the De-
fense Department may place too many constraints on the private sector).
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of Defense facilities. 0 3 If a private enterprise wished to
use the Defense Department launch facilities, however,
the Department of Defense would impose minimal safety
and oversight requirements, much like NASA.1
0 4
E. Coast Guard
Parts of ELV's generally fall into the ocean after a
launch, to be recovered by the launching company. This
creates potential dangers for commercial and pleasure
sea-vessels. As the federal agency with jurisdiction over
the territorial waters of the United States, 10 5 the Coast
Guard has a duty to protect against such hazards. Conse-
quently, the Coast Guard has a clear interest in the plans
of private ELV companies.
F. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms of the Department
of Treasury
The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF)10 6 may assert some jurisdiction over private
launches as well. A rocket falls within the definition of a
destructive device under the Criminal Code's firearm pro-
visions. 0 7 These provisions will apply if a company wants
to import rockets or certain rocket parts into the United
States. Such provisions are not, however, intrinsically tied
to the launch of a rocket and arguably should remain in-
dependent of the launch regulatory process.
G. Federal Communications Commission
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) con-
trols the allocation of radio frequencies.10 8 Because radio
communication is essential to the control of unmanned
os Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 155 (statement of Colonel Jacoby,
Department of Defense).
- Id.; Myers, supra note 16, at 10.
105 Port and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1223(c), 1225 (1982).
-o Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1982).
107 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1982).
1o Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151-609. (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
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space vehicles," 9 the FCC can assert some jurisdiction
over private launches." 0 There is apparently nothing
unique about the use of communication frequencies by
launching companies, as the particular use of the fre-
quency is of little consequence in such a case."' Nothing
will be broadcast to the public. Therefore, the FCC
should have little need to scrutinize private ELV applica-
tions and should routinely issue the requisite temporary
or permanent license.
F. North American Aerospace Defense Command
The North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) is the "watchdog" of outer space." 2 NORAD
tracks all space objects and communicates any changes as
appropriate to NASA and the Department of Defense.
When a private company launches a space vehicle into
space, it is important that NORAD be informed in ad-
vance so that the company can ensure that its rocket will
not cross the path of any other space objects. Moreover,
NORAD will help steer any proposed launch away from
any sensitive military space objects or other dangerous or
undesirable paths. NORAD can carry out this function on
an informal basis for test flights that will not achieve orbit,
but as the private ELV industry matures, the need for for-
mal clearance through NORAD may increase.
II. EXPERIENCE OF SPACE SERVICES INC. OF AMERICA
AND STARSTRUCK
A. SSI's Percheron Experience
SSI first contacted various federal agencies to obtain
-o Rocket launches from private launch sites require a frequency for several
launch support functions, such as monitoring telemetry, radar tracking, and any
self-destruct capability. Myers, supra note 16, at 10; see generally SIG REPORT, supra
note 27, at App. B.
110 See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 34-35.
- See Myers, supra note 16, at 10 (FCC review should be limited to communica-
tions issues since the FCC has little interest in other concerns).
112 See generally id. at 11 (discussing role of NORAD and citing Covault, Center Set
for Soviet Space Monitoring, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 28, 1983, at 56).
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any government clearances that were necessary to launch
the Percheron, SSI's original expendable launch vehi-
cle. 1l 3 Because there was no comprehensive or cohesive
regulatory process, SSI had to contact every agency and
department that it perceived might have an interest in the
launch. 14 At that time, there was no "lead agency" to co-
ordinate the regulatory process, and no other enterprise
had tested the waters by attempting to secure the neces-
sary authorizations. Consequently, SSI was breaking new
ground and had no guidance as to which agencies had in-
terests to protect and what procedures such agencies
might employ to protect their interests. For various rea-
sons, however, SSI was eventually required to obtain for-
mal clearances only from the FAA and the FCC." 5 SSI
also made arrangements to secure the cooperation of the
Navy in tracking and observing the launch vehicle."l 6
Of course, two essential contacts were with NASA and
the FAA. Although NASA's interest had a questionable
legal basis, it certainly had practical grounds. As the lead-
ing authority of the federal government on rockets and
the like, NASA was in a unique position to evaluate fac-
tors such as safety and reliability. SSI ultimately did not
obtain any particular blessing from NASA. Nonetheless,
NASA was helpful in advising SSI on various technical
matters and giving its stamp of approval to the FAA.
The FAA was the only agency with any explicit regula-
tory authority over private rocket launches. Nontheless,
SSI apparently had difficulty finding someone in the FAA
13 SSI designed and built the Percheron without any direct assistance from
NASA.
- Arc Technologies, even though it began its approval process one year after
SSI completed the process, still had to contact "every agency [they] thought might
conceivably be involved and discussed it with all of them." Commercialization Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 245 (statement of Bennett) (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 66 (statement of Hannah). No State Department review was necessary
because the flight plan called for a splashdown 1.5 miles from the launch site,
within the three mile territorial waters of the United States. Id.
116 See Memorandum Re Naval Contact from Arthur M. Dula to David Ross (July
17, 1981), at 2-3 (discussing contracts and arrangements with Navy) (copy on file);
Memoramdum Re Percheron Launch from Arthur M. Dula to David Ross (July 17,
1981), at 1-2 (same) (copy on file).
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who could respond to their launch proposal.1 7  Ulti-
mately the FAA advised SSI that under the FAA's regula-
tions (FAR's)," 8 SSI could launch its rocket only after
obtaining either a waiver of or an exemption from the reg-
ulations." 9 An exemption would have given SSI the right
to conduct more than one launch from their launch facil-
ity.' 20 SSI ultimately obtained a waiver of the regulations
authorizing a single launch of the Percheron.12 1 SSI ap-
parently chose the waiver route because the procedure in-
volves a much shorter review period. 22
SSI specifically requested a waiver of the regulations
proscribing flights in controlled airspace and flights
within five miles of the boundary of any airport. 23 The
actual waiver form was a model of simplicity and required
SSI to provide very little information. 24 In the applica-
tion, SSI described its launch as a "single, nonrecurring,
low altitude, flight test of the Percheron rocket engine test
article." 25 The application also set forth the flight plan of
111 See FAA Contact Memo, supra note 49, at 1 (discussing numerous efforts to
locate a point of contact in the FAA).
118 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.23-.25 (1983).
'111 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing waiver or exemp-
tion requirement for launch).
120 See FAA Contact Memo, supra note 49, at 3 (FAA prefers exemption pro-
cess). The FAA apparently favored the exemption approach because it would
completely remove the launch from the coverage of the FAR's, which were not
designed to apply to commercial launches. Id.
121 See Federal Aviation Administration, Certificate of Waiver or Authorization,
Aug. 4, 1981 [hereinafter cited as FAA Waiver].
'22 See FAA Contact Memo, supra note 49, at 3 (SSI may convince FAA that a
one-time waiver would be fairest approach).
SSI's first contact with the FAA apparently was sometime in early July, 1981. See
id. at 1. (July 17 memo referring to contacts two weeks before). SSI filed its waiver
application on July 23, 1981. SSI Application for Certificate of Waiver or Authori-
zation (July 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as SSI Application]. The FAA granted the
waiver on August 4, 1981. FAA Waiver, supra note 121. The launch was sched-
uled for August 12, 1981. SSI Application, supra at 1. It would have been virtually
impossible to obtain an exemption in this short period of time. See infra notes
141-145 and accompanying text (exemption process took nearly six months).
23 SSI Application, supra note 122, Attachment at 1.
124 See generally id. Virtually the entire application was blank with the "remarks"
section containing more detail. Id. at 1-2.
12- Id. at 1.
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the Percheron, and included a two day launch window. 126
SSI provided significantly more information, however,
in an attachment to the waiver application. The attach-
ment set forth the purpose of the launch, as well as a de-
scription of the rocket and launch site. 127  It also
described the various safety precautions planned by
SSI.128
The FAA granted the waiver two weeks after SSI sub-
mitted its application. 29 The waiver certificate set forth a
number of special provisions, however, including certain
safety requirements. Among the requirements were di-
rectives that
-the operator is responsible for scanning the airspace
within nine miles of the launch site to keep the area clear
of non-participating aircraft and water vessels;
-operations be conducted only between fifteen min-
utes after sunrise and ten o'clock a.m.;
-the operator must maintain direct communications
with the local Air Traffic Control Center when operations
are being conducted in controlled airspace;
-the FAA retains the right to cancel or amend the
waiver if safety conditions so require or if the conditions
of the launch change.' 30
Unfortunately for SSI, the Percheron never successfully
made it off the ground. An explosion during an engine
test destroyed the rocket,i 3 1 temporarily halting SSI's
drive to be the first United States company into space.
Nonetheless, SSI's first experience at obtaining clearance
to launch a private expendable space vehicle was relatively
good in that few agencies were involved and the regula-
tory requirements were light.
6 See id.
,27 Id. Attachment at 1-2.
"28 Id. Attachment at 2-5.
129 See FAA Waiver, supra note 121, at 2-3.
,,' Id.
'"Petition, supra note 48, at 5.
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B. The Conestoga Launch
The regulatory approvals necessary to launch the Con-
estoga, however, were far more extensive. Because of var-
ious technical aspects of the launch' 32 and its desire to
obtain an exemption, 133 SSI had to obtain formal approv-
als from the Department of State and NASA, as well as the
FAA and the FCC. 134 In addition, SSI had to register with
the BATF,' 35 and informally cooperated with the United
States Navy, the Coast Guard, and NORAD.136  The
whole procedure took six months to complete and cost
roughly $250,000.' 37 These time and cost factors consti-
tuted a substantial burden for SSI, 138 particularly because
the launch was merely a test flight for the Conestoga. 3
9
Such impediments to rocket launches constitute an un-
necessary and potentially crippling regulatory barrier to
the creation of a private launch vehicle industry in the
United States.
1. FAA
Rather than seeking a waiver of the FAA regulations, as
it did in the Percheron case, SSI petitioned the FAA for an
152 The Conestoga launch differed from the Percheron launch in two important
respects. First, the launch called for a flight that would carry the rocket beyond
the United States' territorial waters. See MIssioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. Sec-
ond, SSI used a rocket engine provided by NASA, rather than designing their own
engine. See id. at 3.
1" The FAA indicated to SSI that it should request an exemption for flights
beyond United States territory or above 14,500 feet. See Petition, supra note 48, at
10.
134 MIssioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at
60, 65 (statement of Hannah).
13 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 60. SSI had to obtain a permit
from the BATF in order to import several rockets used to test the guidance sys-
tem. Id. Such approval generally should not be necessary because not all private
launching companies will require such test rockets.
,3I d. at 65.
137 Id. at 66 (approval process took six months); id. at 101 (statement of Akaka)
(process took six months and cost a quarter of a million dollars).
138 Id. at 66 (statement of Hannah). SSI obtained the last approval just one day
before the scheduled launch date.
,39The Conestoga merely carried a water payload, rather than a commercial
payload. See MIssioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
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exemption from the regulations solely to launch the Con-
estoga. 140  Despite SSI's request for expedited treat-
ment, 4 1 the approval process was rather time consuming.
SSI filed its petition on March 16, 1982,142 and received a
favorable response on September 1, 1982,143 almost six
months later. In the interim, the FAA twice placed in the
Federal Register a notice of the petition and a summary
thereof, 44 despite SSI's request that this formality be
waived. 145 Such notices are generally issued to give mem-
bers of the public an opportunity to comment on the pro-
priety of the proposed activity. 4 6 In the second notice,
the FAA indicated that certain actions and stipulations
would be necessary to provide the requisite level of safety
in conjunction with the exemption. 147 These included:
(1) establishment of a temporary restricted area within
domestic airspace to isolate the rocket from other air traf-
fic operations;
(2) operational parameters, outside of which the vehi-
cle's thrust would be terminated;
(3) domestic and international notices to airmen and
mariners defining the flight plan;
(4) direct communication between the launch operator
and the local air traffic control;
(5) restrictions in IFR flight operations in affected in-
144 Petition, supra note 48. Although an exemption may cover more than one
launch, SSI requested an exemption solely for the Conestoga. Id. at 6.
, Id. at 1-2.
142 Id. at cover page.
,- In re Space Services, Inc., of America, Grant of Exemption (Sept. 1, 1982)
(announced in 47 Fed. Reg. 16,243 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Exemption].
144 47 Fed. Reg. 16,243 (Apr. 15, 1982) (first notice); 47 Fed. Reg. 32,229 (July
26, 1982) (second notice).
14. See Petition, supra note 48, at 2 (requesting waiver of time limits, procedural
requirements, and publication in Federal Register of summary petition); Supple-
mental Letter, supra note 3 (submitting that second comment period was "totally
unnecessary" and would "probably delay the proposed launch at considerable ex-
pense to SSI.")
146 14 C.F.R. § 11.27(c), (e), (g) (1984). See 47 Fed. Reg. 16,243 (Apr. 15,
1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 32,229 (July 26, 1982).
147 47 Fed. Reg. at 32,230.
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ternational air space. 48
In its petition SSI requested a launch window of virtu-
ally two months in order to give it time to overcome any
delays that might arise.1 49 The petition described both
the Conestoga and the launch site, and included attach-
ments that set forth all of the technical aspects and capa-
bilities of the launch vehicle. 5° The petition also detailed
the proposed flight path of the Conestoga, which did not
cross any permanent human habitations or foreign terri-
tory.1 5 1 After generally describing the history of SSI, the
petition explained the relationship between SSI and other
enterprises involved in the launch.152 Additionally, the
petition designated the flight as a "sub-orbital test simu-
lating payload orbital injection, "153 and discussed the fu-
ture potential of the Conestoga rocket.' 54
One of the more important portions of the petition set
forth the safety precautions planned by SSI. t5 5 With re-
spect to personnel, SSI hired an experienced launch con-
tractor and experienced engineering consultants. 56 The
use of the reliable Minuteman I rocket motor further en-
hanced the presumption of safety. 57 The petition also
specified safety measures including:
-safe distances between the launch pad and the control
facilities and viewing areas;
-a barricade to protect the control facilities;
-portable fire fighting equipment;
-security and onsite operations personnel;
148 Id. (no comments received in response to the first notice). See id. No com-
ments were received with regard to the second notice. Exemption, supra note 143,
at 1.
149 Petition, supra note 48, at 2.
15o Id. at 3.
15, Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 4-5.
1s-1 Id. at 5.
1 Id. at 6. The production model Conestoga rocket will be capable of placing
satellites in orbit. Id. at 6.
I d. at 6-7.
I.- Id. at 6.
57 See id. at 3.
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-media announcements of the launch time and flight
plan;
-direct communications with the local FAA air traffic
control center; and
-a radio initiated self-destruct device. 158
SSI also proposed that the FAA issue appropriate safety
warnings to warn aircraft and sea vessels of the flight
plan. 15
9
SSI urged in its petition that the Conestoga launch
should be exempt from FAR Part 101, Subpart C,' 60 the
exclusive FAA regulations applicable to private rocket
launches. 6' The argument advanced in support of an ex-
emption from the regulations was relatively simple. SSI
asserted primarily that the existing regulations did not
contemplate private launches on the large scale of the
Conestoga and emphasized the safety precautions taken
by SSI.162
The FAA granted SSI a partial exemption from the reg-
ulations1 63 and established a temporary restricted area
around the launch site.1 64  Specifically, the FAA elimi-
nated the proscriptions against the operation of a rocket
in controlled airspace or within five miles of the boundary
of an airport.1 65 The FAA, however, denied an exemption
from the remaining provisions of FAR Part 101, Subpart
C.' 66 The FAA reasoned that several of the provisions
'.-" Id. at 6-7.
1m Id. at 7. The FAA apparently issued air and safety warnings for the Cones-
toga launch. See Myers, supra note 16, at 5.
" - See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting FAA
regulations concerning rocket launches).
-1 Petition, supra note 48, at 9-11. SSI also requested an exemption from any
other regulations that the FAA may deem applicable. Id. at 11.
"62 Id. at 10.
-. Exemption, supra note 143, at 3.
- Establishment of Temporary Restricted Area R-6303, Matagorda Island,
Texas, 47 Fed. Reg. 34,363 (Aug. 9, 1982). Included in the notice's restricted
area was the airspace covered by SSI's flight plan. Id. The FAA determined that
the notice and public procedure otherwise required would be counterproductive
and that the regulation thus would take effect in less than thirty days after its
publication. Id.
165 Id.
". Exemption, supra note 143, at 3.
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amounted to a "clear weather environment" requirement
that could not be satisfied by air traffic control surveil-
lance and public notice.1 67 Such actions did not constitute
"an equivalent level of safety." 1 68  Consequently, SSI
needed ideal weather conditions to initiate the launch.
The FAA also imposed certain other conditions on its
approval. The grant of exemption required SSI to enter
into an agreement with a nearby airport to close the air-
port during the launch, to maintain insurance coverage in
the amount of $100 million, and to ensure that the rocket
did not stray beyond certain parameters.' 69 The order
also required direct regular communication prior to the
launch between SSI and the Houston Air Traffic Control
Center, which had the authority to delay the launch for
safety reasons. 70 Finally, the authorization imposed a
general duty on SSI to "delay, cancel, or terminate...
[the] rocket operation at any time the safety of persons or
property is jeopardized."''7
2. Department of State
Although SSI believed that an export license was not
appropriate for the launch of the Conestoga,1 72 SSI sub-
mitted a letter to the office of Munitions Control of the
Department of State on April 15, 1982,173 requesting the
requisite approval, in response to informal suggestions
from the State Department that SSI's launch might re-
167 Id. at 2.
I" Id.
w,' Id. at 3-5.
170 Id. at 3-4.
17, Id. at 5.
172 See Memorandum Re Status of Request for Export License from James R.
Myers to Charles M. Chafer (Aug. 25, 1982), at 1 (export license not necessary or
appropriate) [hereinafter cited as Export License Memo]; SSI requested license
without challenge only to expedite processing); Letter from James V. Carroll to
Charles R. Hartley, Office of Munitions Control (Apr. 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Carroll Letter].
173 Carroll Letter, supra note 172. SSI submitted a cover letter and the other
relevant information because the export license form did not accommodate the
information pertinent to the launch of an ELV. See Export License Memo, supra
note 172, at 1.
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quire an export permit. 7 4 Obtaining the Department of
State approval proved to be somewhat difficult.' 75 As of
June 4, 1982, the Office of Munitions Control had not re-
ceived all of the comments from the various relevant ad-
ministrative agencies and no determination had been
reached as to whether an export permit was required.176
Despite the fact that the State Department had delivered a
written statement to the FAA as of August 25, 1982, indi-
cating that it had no objections to the launch, 77 the De-
partment of State did not issue the necessary export
authorization to SSI until September 7, 1982,178 just one
day before the scheduled launch.
The Office of Munitions Control of the Department of
State granted SSI's request for approval under the Arms
Export Control Act to launch the Conestoga, subject to
certain con'ditions and limitations. 79 Specifically, the De-
partment of State limited its authorization to the Cones-
toga launch, indicating that subsequent launches would
require a separate review and approval.18 0 The Depart-
ment of State also based its authorization on the under-
standing that SSI had agreed to comply with the various
safety requirements imposed on the launch by NASA and
the FAA.' The approval was subject to the understand-
ing that SSI had obtained $100 million of insurance for
171 See Export License Memo, supra note 172, at 1; Carroll Letter, supra note
172.
1. See generally Export License Memo, supra note 172 (discussing lengthy State
Department approval process). At one point, just two weeks prior to the launch,
the State Department indicated that it could not issue an export license prior to
the scheduled launch date despite the fact that NASA and the FAA already had
satisfied all of the State Department concerns and had communicated to the FAA
that they had no objections to the launch. See Export License Memo, supra note
172, at 3.
17,1 Export License Memo, supra note 172, at 2.
177 See id. at 3.
17m Letter from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Munitions Control, to
James R. Myers (Sept. 7, 1982) (approving SSI's request for export license) [here-
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any damages resulting from the launch. 182 Finally, the
consent letter required SSI to indemnify the United States
government for any damages and expenses that might
arise in connection with the launch, including any pay-
ments made pursuant to any treaty.
183
3. NASA
Because NASA sold the booster used by SSI to launch
the Conestoga, NASA exercised some control over the
launch. Prior to approving the sale of the engine, NASA
assessed the technical and safety aspects of the launch and
reviewed some of the documentation prepared by SSI for
other agencies. 84 The sales contract itself also required
that SSI obtain flight insurance to indemnify the United
States government.' 85 NASA's interest in the launch, how-
ever, went no further than the booster purchase
agreement.
In addition to the above specific requirements, SSI ob-
tained a temporary permit from the FCC to operate a ra-
dio frequency to communicate with the Conestoga.
186 SSI
also cooperated informally with NORAD and the Depart-
ment of Defense, 87 apparently satisfying any and all
concerns.
C. Starstruck's Dolphin
Starstruck attempted to launch its rocket, the Dolphin,
from an ocean platform in international waters off the
coast of California. 88 Due largely to the location of the
launch outside of the United States territorial waters, the
182 Id.
183 Id.
''N MISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; see Supplemental Letter, supra note 3
(NASA agreed to provide SSI with a booster after intensive review of launch
plans, technical expertise, range safety, insurance, and development plans).
18-5 MISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
186 Myers, supra note 16, at 10; see Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 65
(SSI obtained formal approval from FCC).
,87 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 65.
18H Dophin Launch, supra note 5, at 6; see Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at
232 (statement of Bennett).
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Department of State, rather than the FAA, was the pri-
mary government body to regulate the company.' 8 9 In
fact, the FAA had no jurisdiction and Starstruck techni-
cally did not have to comply with the FAA regulations.
Consequently, Starstruck did not have to apply for a
waiver or an exemption from the FAA regulations.1 90 The
FAA nonetheless played a part in the process via the De-
partment of State and the interagency approval
procedure. 191
The Department of State regulation of.Starstruck was
also significantly different from the approach taken in the
SSI launch of the Conestoga I. Because Starstruck was
not planning to launch from United States territory into
international airspace, the launch itself did not qualify as
an export.19 2 As a result, the launch did not require an
export permit from the Department of State. Nontheless,
an export permit was necessary merely to transport the
rocket to the launch site.193 Such transport constitutes an
export in the usual sense of the word, so there is little
question as to the propriety of the Department of State's
regulatory function.
The Department of State used its jurisdiction over the
launch vehicle to obtain information comparable to that
required of SSI. Additionally, by referring the informa-
tion to NASA, the FAA, and the Department of Defense,
the Department of State was able to ensure that the
launch posed no safety problems.'9 4 The State Depart-
i"' Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 233, 241. (Starstruck under basic
jurisdiction of State Department); Myers, supra note 16, at 5 (suggesting FAA reg-
ulations not applicable because launch not from United States territory).
I" Myers, supra note 16, at 5.
it" See id. (FAA involvement in Dolphin launch coordinated through State De-
partment export license procedures).
11,2 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (export refers to sending article
"out of the United States").
, See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 245-46 (statement of Bennett)
(export permit primary governing document in Starstruck launch); Myers, supra
note 16, at 8 (State Department granted Starstruck export license for Dolphin).
It Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 241 (statement of Bennett) (export
permit primary governing document in Starstruck launch); Myers, supra note 16,
at 8 (State Department granted Starstruck export license for Dolphin).
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ment required Starstruck to obtain indemnity insurance
for the United States as well. 95 Thus, the Department of
State used its export jurisdiction to reach the substantive
regulatory requirements that were ultimately imposed on
the launch. It is not clear that the State Department had
the authority to extend its consideration of the export li-
cense to the particulars of the launch. It is appropriate,
however, for the Department of State to consider in issu-
ing export permits the uses to which the item will be put
after its export. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the
State Department over launch activities of private compa-
nies is arguably more appropriate in launches from inter-
national waters than it is in launches from the territorial
United States.
Starstruck had informal conversations with many other
agencies, but was required to obtain only one other li-
cense. In addition to the export license, Starstruck had to
obtain an experimental radio license from the FCC. 19 6
Because Starstruck's original launch attempt was not
successful 197 and it needed approval of a new launch date,
it became the first private enterprise to operate under the
Department of Transportation's leadership. 98 Soon after
the first scrubbed launch, Starstruck officials met with De-
partment of Transportation officials to determine the ap-
propriate procedures for rescheduling the launch in
March of 1984.'99
Although some of the approvals and arrangements
were relatively easy to obtain, the experience of SSI
clearly reveals the need to streamline the regulatory pro-
cess imposed on private ELV launches. Moreover, Star-
struck, despite the groundbreaking experience of SSI, had
to reinvent the wheel one year later because its plans were
111.1 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 241.
l w See id. at 233; Myers, supra note 128, at 10.
197 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing Starstruck's attempts
to launch the Dolphin).
-8. See Dolphin Launch, supra note 5, at 7; 1984 Hearings, supra note 69, at 47-8
(statement of Jenna Dorn, Department of Transportation).
'- See Dolphin Launch, supra note 5, at 7.
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different from those of SSI. Starstruck thus had to go
through the same time-consuming process of contacting
every agency that "might conceivably be involved. ' 20 0 It
is "It]his kind of unnecessary red tape [that] entails costly
delays and might discourage [the] private sector invest-
ment in the space launch business. 20 1 Indeed there is a
consensus that the various regulatory agencies need to co-
ordinate their efforts to allow the ELV industry to grow
without having to overcome a burdensome regulatory
quagmire. In response to this consensus the administra-
tion designated the Department of Transportation as the
lead agency. 2  Several questions remain, however: Does
the executive branch have the authority to regulate pri-
vate ELV's? If so, is the DOT the appropriate agency to
direct the regulatory reform? What should be the func-
tion and structure of the lead agency? And finally, what
are the concerns that the regulations should address?
The next three sections of this article attempt to respond
to these questions.
III. AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE PRIVATE ELV's
UNDER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw
Any analysis of the regulatory system in the United
States must begin with the United States' international re-
sponsibility to regulate private ELV's. Perhaps more im-
portant, however, is its authority under domestic law to
regulate private rockets. Generally, when Congress deter-
mines that the government should regulate an industry, it
passes authorizing legislation that delegates the regula-
tory responsibility to a particular agency. Because there is
no such authorizing legislation, the current source of the
domestic power to regulate private ELV's is unclear.
2W Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 245 (statement of Bennett); see also
supra note 114 (discussing Arc Technologies).
201 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 114 (statement of Akaka).
202 DOT Press Release, supra note 28.
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A. International and Liability Obligations to Regulate
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST)20 3 requires that
states parties ensure that all activities conducted in space
by their nationals are consistent with the provisions of the
treaty. The OST states that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international re-
sponsibility for national activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activi-
ties are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, and for assuring that national activ-
ities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set
forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-govern-
mental entities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies shall require authorization and continu-
ing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty. 0 4
The provision does not distinguish between the activities
of a state and the space activities of that state's private
enterprises.20 5 Moreover, a state party that carries on its
registry an object launched into space "shall retain juris-
diction and control over such object. ' 20 6 Thus the treaty
clearly contemplates private space activities 20 7 and man-
dates that states parties take responsibility for such activi-
ties, even if the state does not exercise any direct or
indirect control over such activities. 20 8
20. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as
OST].
204 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). It is important to note that "responsibility" for
private space activities is much broader than "liability" for such launches.
Gorove, Liability of the State and Private Companies for Mishaps Involving Space Activities,
FIRST ABA FORUM ON AIR AND SPACE LAw, at 2 (1984).
-5 See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 24.
201; OST, supra note 203, art. 8.
207 Originally the USSR maintained that private enterprise should not be al-
lowed to participate in space activities. They argued that only nation-states
should conduct space activities. The Soviet Union eventually agreed to the con-
trary, however, and the OST makes clear the legal status of private space activities
under international law. LAY & TAUBENFELD, THE LAw RELATIVE TO ACTIVITIES OF
MAN IN SPACE, 92-3 (1970).
2oo N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAw: TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE 81 (1982).
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Under the OST, states parties must ensure that the ac-
tivities of their nationals conform to the other provisions
of the treaty. 20 9 The fundamental principles that the
United States must apply to private space companies
through regulations to fulfill its OST obligations include:
(1) space, including celestial bodies, is the province of
mankind and should be developed for mankind's
benefit;2 10
(2) space, including celestial bodies, is free for explora-
tion, use, and exploitation by all;21 1
(3) space, including celestial bodies, is not subject to
appropriation by any nation;21 2
209 OST, supra note 203, art. 6.
210 Id. preamble, art. 1. The OST states that space, including celestial bodies,
should be used for the "benefit of all peoples," and is the "province of mankind."
Id. For purposes of space law, "the province of mankind" has the same meaning
as "benefit of mankind." C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 42, 252 (1982).
211 OST, supra note 203, art. 1. The OST provides that "[oluter space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all
States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance
with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bod-
ies." OST, supra note 203, art. 1. Although the treaty refers only to free explora-
tion and use, its legislative history demonstrates that article one applies also to
exploitation of natural resources. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 210, at 39-42; see U. N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 202 (1972), reprinted in 4 N. JASENTULIYANA & R. LEE,
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 128, 129-30 (1981) (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space [COPUOS] delegate from Italy asserting OST laid down principle of
freedom of all states to exploit lunar resources); 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 65 (1975) (freedom to use outer space includes
freedom to exploit through extraction of minerals); S. BHATr, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
OUTER SPACE 153 (1973) (freedom to use is freedom to exploit moon and its re-
sources as well as space). The right to exploit the resources of space is consistent
with the free access requirements of the treaty. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 210, at
41.
212 OST, supra note 203, art. 2. The OST provides that "outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."
OST, supra note 203, art. 2. This provision of the OST generally has not been
interpreted as prohibiting the appropriation of celestial body resources. 0.
OGUNBANWO, supra note 211, at 217; C. CHRISTOL, supra note 210, at 277.
In 1976 a group of eight equatorial countries challenged the nonappropriation
principle by adopting what is now known as the "Bogota Declaration." Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, Broadcasting Satellite Conference, Doc. No.
81-E (Jan. 17, 1977), Annex 4, reprinted in 6J. SPACE L. 193 (1978). In the Declara-
tion the countries claimed sovereignty over portions of the geostationary orbit,
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(4) celestial bodies shall be used only for peaceful
purposes ;213
(5) international law extends to space and celestial
bodies;2 1 4 and
(6) those conducting space activities should avoid ter-
restrial environmental damage.2t 5
Although this is not an exhaustive list of all relevant provi-
sions incorporated in the OST that govern activities in
space, the others are relatively less important and are not
discussed here.21 6
Another OST provision imposes liability on a state for
the private space activities of its nationals. Article 7 pro-
vides that:
each State Party from whose territory or facility an object
is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its national or juridical per-
sons by such object or its component parts on the Earth,
in air space or in outer space, including the moon and ce-
lestial bodies.21 7
The Liability Convention of 1972218 further clarifies and
which is located approximately 35,800 kilometers above the equator and is the
most valuable location for a communications satellite. Gorbiel, The Legal Status of
Geostationary Orbit: Some Remarks, 6J. SPACE L. 171 (1978). Many delegates sharply
attacked the claim to ownership and one commentator dismissed it as "preposter-
ous." Id. at 176-77.
215 OST, supra note 203, art. 4. Although the peaceful purposes provision of
the OST covers only the moon and other celestial bodies, OST, supra note 203,
art. 4, it is generally understood that all of space should be used only for peaceful
purposes. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 210, at 22-36 (discussing scope of peaceful
purposes principle).
2,104ST, supra note 203, art 3. The OST provides that "international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations," applies to outer space and celestial
bodies. OST, supra note 203, art. 3. The incorporation of international law into
space law indicates that international legal principles determine the extent to
which treaty provisions are binding, and that the corpus of international law sup-
plements the coverage of existing space law. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 210, at 48.
215 OST, supra note 203, art. 9.
16 For a more complete discussion of the OST, see generally C. CHRISTOL,
supra note 210.
7 OST, supra note 203, art. 7.
218 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter
cited as Liability Convention].
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expands on this directive, providing that "[a] launching
State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the
earth or to aircraft in flight."' 2 ' 9 The Liability Convention
defines a launching state as a state that "launches or pro-
cures the launching of a space object" or a state "from
whose territory or facility a space object is launched. 220
Thus the United States is primarily liable under interna-
tional law for purely private space vehicles that launch
from the United States or its territorial waters.22 '
The Liability Convention does not apply, however, to
damage to a United States national caused by a United
States private space vehicle.2 22 Consequently, claimants
within the United States would have to resort to domestic
law remedies. For instance, the injured party may pro-
ceed against the United States government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act,223 although the liability of the
government with respect to private rocket launches even
under this act is highly suspect. Alternatively, a claimant
could sue the launching company itself under the appro-
priate state tort law.224 In appropriate circumstances a
court might find the enterprise to be strictly liable be-
cause of the "abnormally dangerous" character of a
rocket launch and recovery.225
Finally, the Registration Convention 22 6 requires that
the United States register on an international registry all
space objects launched from its territory. 227 The Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations maintains the registry,
2 19 Id. art. 2.
220 Id. art. 1(c).
2' See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 23-24.
22 The Convention specifically indicates that it does not apply to damage
caused by a space object of a launching state to one of its nationals. Liability
Convention, supra note 218, art. 7(a).
223 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
22, Dula, supra note 92, at 117.
225 Id.
226 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
opened for signature on Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480.
227 Id. art. 2.
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to which all nations have full and open access. 228  This re-
gistration obligation further establishes the international
responsibility of the United States for its private ELV
launches.
B. Authorization for Domestic Regulation
Although the space treaties mandate that the United
States regulate private ELV's, it is not clear whether, as a
domestic matter, the executive branch has the authority to
regulate the industry. The President has only those pow-
ers expressly granted to the executive branch by the Con-
stitution and those delegated to certain administrative
agencies by acts of Congress. Although it gave its advice
and consent to the OST, Congress has not adopted any
legislation specifically authorizing an agency to issue reg-
ulations to regulate private ELV's. 229 To the extent that
228 Id. art. 3.
229 Representative Akaka introduced a bill concerning the commercialization of
expendable launch vehicles on September 21, 1983. H.R. 3942, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. E171 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983), previously introduced as
H.R. 7411, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG REC. E5377 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982).
A bill has also been introduced in the Senate. S. 560, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CON; REC. S1507 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983). The Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications held hearings on H.R. 3942, but only one witness, Elizabeth
Dole, accompanied by Jeffrey N. Shane and Jenna Dorn, testified. See ELV Hear-
ings, supra note 25. The subcommittee held further hearings on March 29, 1984,
to further consider H.R. 3942. 1984 Hearings, supra note 69, at 43 (statement of
Representative Volkmer).
At the mark-up session held subsequently, the Subcommittee failed to reach a
consensus on the degree of authority that should be vested in the Department of
Transportation. Some Congressmen argued that DOT should have exclusive
regulatory authority, as advocated by this article. Others asserted that the other
federal agencies should retain their jurisdiction over ELV's. Space Legislation
Bogged Down Temporarily, J. COM., Apr. 6, 1984, at 2A.
Eventually, the Subcommittee approved'a version of the bill that would give the
DOT virtually exclusive regulatory power over ELV's. J. CoM., April 12, 1984, at
IA.
The full Committee on Science and Technology subsequently adopted the leg-
islation and referred it to the House of Representatives. H.R. REP. No. 98-816,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The House passed H.R. 3942 onJune 5, 1984. 130
CONG. REC. H 5220 (daily ed. June 5, 1984). The Senate Commerce Committee
plans to draft its own legislation and may take action on the matter as soon as
August, 1984.
The legislation adopted by the House provides for a regulatory structure quite
similar to that advocated by this article. See H.R. 3942, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
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the regulation of private space activities is a foreign affairs
matter, the President might be able to issue regulations by
virtue of the extensive power over foreign affairs vested in
the executive branch.23 ° It may be difficult, however, de-
spite the obvious international implications of space activ-
ities, to extend the foreign affairs power to what is in fact
a domestic regulatory matter.
It is more likely that the executive could derive the req-
uisite regulatory power from the OST itself. Article 6 of
the United States Constitution provides that "all Treaties
made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. ' ' 23' A treaty will operate
as federal law, however, only if it is self-executing in that it
requires no further implementing legislation to become
part of the domestic law of the United States.232 If the
OST is a self-executing treaty, the provisions of the treaty
are directly applicable to private enterprises and the exec-
utive branch has the power to issue regulations to enforce
the provisions.233 The President would need no addi-
tional legislation to authorize regulations. Rather, the
self-executing mandate in the OST that the United States
(1984). While the contents of the bill are appropriate at the current time, if
passed by the Senate, the structure would be set in stone. Once it is codified, it
will be more difficult to adapt the regulatory structure to reflect the experience of
the DOT. If the DOT followed the approach of H.R. 3942 under the authority of
an executive order, rather than legislation, it would have the flexibility to make
major changes in the regulatory structure if appropriate. For this reason, Con-
gress should withhold making a legislative response to private ELV's until the
DOT has had an opportunity to test a comprehensive regulatory approach and
identify the needs of the public and the industry. The scant experience of the
government in regulating the SSI and Starstruck rockets is not a sufficient basis
for creating a permanent regulatory structure.
230 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1887). See generally United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (discussing broad foreign af-
fairs power of President); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (defining nature of President's foreign affairs power).
231 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
232 Valentine v. United States ex rel Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 141(1) (1962).
2 The United States Constitution provides that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3. Thus the President
may direct the appropriate agency of the executive branch to issue regulations to
carry out the federal law.
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must authorize and continually supervise private space ac-
tivities would confer sufficient power on the executive to
devise appropriate regulations.
1. What is a Self-executing 'Treaty?
A treaty that manifests an intention that it shall become
effective as domestic law of the United States at the same
time that it becomes binding on the United States is self-
executing and supercedes any prior inconsistent law.234
Ultimately, it is the courts that resolve the question of
self-execution, as a matter of interpretation, provided the
issue arises in litigation. 23 5 The initial determination as to
whether a particular treaty is self-executing, however, be-
longs to the executive branch.236 Consequently, if the
President determines that the Outer Space Treaty is self-
executing and issues regulations to enforce its provisions,
the regulations will be valid unless a court later deter-
mines that the President's interpretation was incorrect. In
making such an interpretation, a court is to give great
weight to the interpretation made by the executive
branch.237 Thus, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that a
decision by the President would fall in litigation unless it
lacked a reasonably justifiable basis.
Generally, a treaty is "to be regarded in courts ofjustice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it op-
erates of itself without the aid of any legislative provi-
sion. ' 23s This approach is of little assistance in evaluating
the authority of the executive branch to implement a
234 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 141(1) and 154(2)
(1962).
235 Id. § 154.
236 Id. § 149. The President has the authority to interpret the international ef-
fect of international agreements. Id. Moreover, because the courts cannot inter-
pret a treaty until it is brought before them in litigation, and Congress cannot
effectively interpret an international agreement, the executive branch must per-
form the task as an ambit of its foreign affairs powers.
27 Id. § 152. The factors that a court will consider generally in interpreting a
treaty are set forth in Restatement section 147. Id. § 147.
238 Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
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treaty.23 9 One commentator has thus concluded that a
treaty is self-executing when it "by [its] own terms can be
carried into effect by administrative authorities . . . [and]
can be implemented by the executive branch itself without
recourse to congressional action. 240
The primary criterion in determining whether a particu-
lar treaty is self-executing is whether the parties intended
the agreement to become binding and enforceable with-
out any implementing legislation.2 4 ' The most important
factor in evaluating the intent of the parties is the lan-
guage employed in the document.242 Thus, if possible, a
court will find a treaty to be self-operative if reasonably
possible within the scope of the language.243 Courts will
also find a treaty to be self-executing if the provisions of
the treaty "prescribe a rule by which the rights of the pri-
vate citizen or subject may be determined. 244
A court may also look at other factors bearing on the
interpretation, the most prevalent of which is the con-
struction adopted by the executive branch.245 Courts ap-
propriately give great deference to the opinion of the
President, the formulator of the treaty.246 At least one
court has suggested that a treaty should be considered
self-executing if the President did not request any imple-
menting legislation when the treaty was transmitted for
the advice and consent of the Senate.247
239 See Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 178, 185 (1953) (court in Foster overlooked the fact that the executive may
implement a treaty).
240 Id. at 193.
241 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1899); see also Henry, When is a Treaty Self-
Executing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 776 (1929); Note, Self-Execution of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions Under United States Laws, 24 UCLA REV. L. 387, 390-391 (1976).
242 Maiorano v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 273 (1909); Diggs v. Rich-
ardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
243 See Comment, Treaties - Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas Is Not Self-
Executing: U.S. v. Postal, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 293, 299-300 (1979).
244 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
245 Comment, supra note 243, at 298.
246 See Aerovias Interamericanas De Panama v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197
F. Supp. 230, 247 (S.D. Fla. 1961) rev'd, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962); Comment,
supra note 243, at 298.
247 Aerovias, 197 F. Supp. at 248; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
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2. Is the Outer Space Treaty Self-Executing?
Although at least one commentator has suggested that
the Outer Space Treaty is not self-executing, 248 it is ap-
parent that the parties to the OST clearly intended that
each state would supervise the space activities of its na-
tionals. This mandate gives the executive power to pre-
scribe the particular rules and regulations, guided by the
principles of the treaty, to implement the treaty in domes-
tic United States law.2 49
An examination of the language of the OST suggests
that the drafters and parties intended to impose on all
parties an affirmative obligation to regulate private space
activities. The treaty specifies that states "shall" bear in-
ternational responsibility for "assuring" that private enti-
ties conduct their activities in conformance with the
provisions of the treaty. 250  The treaty provides further
that private activities "shall" require authorization and
continued supervision.2 5I These are not discretionary
provisions. The language does not leave the parties free,
at their leisure, to regulate private activities as they deem
it appropriate. Rather, the treaty uses obligatory lan-
guage that requires states to regulate in order to assure
conformance with the treaty provisions.2 52 The regula-
tory requirement is not subject to further authorizing leg-
islation of the various parties. Rather, it mandates that
regulations be imposed, and it creates an obligation that
RELATIONS LAW § 140 comment b, illustration 4 (1962) (discussing President's
duty to request implementing legislation).
.241 See Dula, supra note 92, at 117; Letter from Art Dula to Ralph Drury Martin,
Attorney-Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, July 13, 1981.
249 See supra note 233 and accompanying text (President has authority to enforce
a self-executing treaty through rules and regulations).
2:0 OST, supra note 203, art. 6.
2 Id. (emphasis added). One commentator suggests that the authorization and
supervision provisions "seem to be directly addressed to physical persons and
juridical entities." Vereshchetin, International Space Law and Domestic Law: Problems
of Interrelations, 9J. SPACE L. 31, 36 (1981); see also Bockstiegel, Legal Implications of
Commercial Space Activities, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 1, 12 (1981) (Outer Space Treaty applies to commercial
space activities by private industry).
252 See Vereshchetin, supra note 251, at 40.
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private individuals and states could enforce against the
United States if the government failed to properly regu-
late the space activities of its nationals.
The Department of State has at least implicitly indi-
cated that it believes that the OST is self-executing. 25 3
Moreover, although the President has not issued a formal
statement with respect to the question of whether the
treaty is self-executing, the executive apparently made
such a determination prior to directing'the DOT to act as
the lead regulatory agency.25 4 In addition, the President,
at the time the treaty was ratified by the United States, did
not seek any implementing legislation. Thus, not only has
the executive implicitly decided that the treaty is self-exe-
cuting, any court passing on the matter would give great
deference to this judgment. Finally, Congress apparently
approves of the executive branch's regulatory actions to
date. Congress has passed no legislation altering the ex-
isting procedures and has not indicated that legislation is
necessary to regulate private ELV's. 55
Perhaps the most compelling justification for allowing
253 SSI originally maintained in a legal memorandum delivered to the Depart-
ment of State that the regulatory and supervision provisions of the OST are not
self-executing and that such provisions do not constrain private activities absent
legislation by Congress. See Letter from Ralph Drury Martin, Attorney-Advisor,
Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Charles M. Chafer, June 24,
1981 (noting SSI's legal advisor's opinion that relevant provision of OST not self-
executing). The State Department responded that it would carefully consider the
opinion but that the Department had not accepted that view. Id. In light of the
State Department's subsequent regulation of the SSI launch activities, it seems
clear that the Department views the treaty as self-executing. Otherwise, its export
permit procedure would not legally be able to address issues extraneous to the
actual export of the rocket. Moreover, the Department of State has indicated that
"[a] mechanism is already in place which provides the necessary control over
launches and payloads to comply with the international obligations of the United
States and to ensure that its foreign policy and security interests are protected."
1984 Hearings, supra note 69, at 72 (statement of Otho Eskin, Director, Office of
Advanced Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International, Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, Department of State).
254 See Finch, Space Commercialization and Evolving Public International Law, FIRST
ABA FORUM ON AIR AND SPACE LAw, at 2 (1984) (President's announcement im-
plemented nationally the legal regulatory environment of space
commercialization).
255 See Myers, supra note 16, at 11 (Congress willing to approve private launches
without legislation specifically addressing private ELV's). Even if Congress even-
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the executive branch to regulate private ELV's under the
Outer Space Treaty is the responsibility of the United
States to fully execute all international obligations. 256  A
state may not use its failure to adopt domestic legislation
to evade its international obligations. 257 More specifically,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that
"[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. ' 258 To
flaunt the obligations imposed on the United States by the
OST would thus violate international law. As a conse-
quence, it would be most prudent for the government, as
a domestic matter, to deem the treaty to be self-executing
and issue appropriate regulations thereunder.
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS
A. Lead Agency
There is little consensus as to which agency or depart-
ment should coordinate the establishment of the ELV reg-
ulations. At least seven agencies or departments have
been mentioned as the appropiate body to take over the
lead agency role, including NASA, the FAA, the FCC, the
tually adopts legislation establishing a regulatory structure, Congress has not sug-
gested that such legislation is necessary to implement the OST.
6., G SCHWARTZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136
(6th ed. 1976); Houben, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States, 61 AM.J. INT'L L. 703 (1967).
In this regard, one commentator has reasoned in the context of the Outer Space
Treaty that:
[hiaving undertaken an international treaty obligation, a State owing
to the principle ofpacta sunt servanda is bound to undertake all the
necessary measures to prevent the violation of the obligation by ac-
tions of its physical or juridical entities. International law leaves the
choice of the relevant techniques and means to the discretion of the
State concerned, without predetermining the mechanism of the na-
tional implementation of the rules of international law.
Vereschetin, supra note 251, at 37.
257 Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties, Draft Convention, with Comment, Prepared
by the Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SPEC.
Supp. 653, 1029 (1935); see generally Vereschetin, supra note 251, at 37.
2-18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM.J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
679 (1969).
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Department of Defense, the State Department, the De-
partment of Commerce, and the Department of Transpor-
tation.259 In November of 1983, after several working
groups had considered the matter, the administration de-
cided to give the responsibility to the DOT. n° Since that
time, the DOT has focused on coordinating the regulatory
agencies in order to streamline the regulatory process.2 6 '
It appears that lodging the central regulatory authority
in a yet to be created agency within the DOT-a "Launch
Agency"-is the most appropriate method of streamlining
the regulatory process. First, expendable launch vehicles
are the first carriers in an emerging private space trans-
poration industry. Private enterprise will use ELV's to
transport space objects into space. It is a transportation
industry and thus is appropriately regulated by the de-
partment given jurisdiction over transportation. Second,
the most important agency in the confused regulatory
process to date has been the FAA. By far the most time-
consuming and extensive approval process encountered
by SSI was the FAA exemption.26 2 Because any lead
agency must work closely with the FAA, an agency within
the DOT would be in an ideal position to work with the
FAA to establish meaningful regulations for private
ELV's. An intra-agency relationship in this respect would
facilitate communication greatly and possibly result in a
more cohesive approach.
In any event, it seems clear that no other single agency
should perform the lead agency task. NASA is not the ap-
propriate body to act as the lead agency in the regulation
of private ELV's. Perhaps the best reason not to have
259 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Akaka) (rec-
ognizing as possible lead agency FAA, FCC, Department of Defense, Department
of State; recommending Department of Commerce); Committee Print, supra note
2, at 20 (four agencies as possible lead agency: Department of Commerce, Depart-
ment of Transportation (specifically the FAA), Department of State, and NASA).
- DOT Press Release, supra note 28.
261 Id.
'6 See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text (FAA exemption procedure
took six months).
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NASA as the lead agency is that NASA is not and does not
want to be a regulatory body.26 NASA's most effective
role is as a supporting agency that can lend its technical
experience and advice without directly regulating specific
launches.264 Moreover, as the promoter of the shuttle,
NASA may have a conflict of interest in regulating private
ELV's.265
SSI favors the FAA as the lead agency,266 probably be-
cause of the relationships that SSI has already established
with the FAA.267 SSI views the FAA as an "action agency"
that has experience in dealing with the kinds of concerns
and business that ELV's present.268 A bill introduced into
the Senate would also adopt the FAA as the lead
agency, 269 due to its experience in the related area of aer-
onautics.2 70 While the aviation industry is related, the
FAA itself has little technical expertise in the field of space
launches. 27' Rather than expanding the FAA and compli-
cating its regulatory mission, it would be more appropri-
ate to delegate the lead agency tasks to a parallel agency
within the DOT. Moreover, the FAA has no jurisdiction
over launches outside the United States and has no man-
date to regulate space vehicles once they leave United
States air space.272
Similarly, the FCC is not the ideal agency to regulate
and promote launch activities. The FCC does issue
licenses for the use of communications frequencies, but
otherwise, the agency has no nexus to or experience with
263 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (NASA does not want to regulate
ELV industry).
2- See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 67, 71 (statement of Hannah)
(suggesting NASA role as supporting agency; NASA can provide technical in-
sights to lead agency).
26 See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 20 (NASA may have a conflict of
interest).
2- Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 61 (statement of Hannah).
267 Id.
26$ Id.
269 S. 560, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
270 See Committee Print, supra note 2, at 20.
271 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Akaka).
272 Id.
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the private ELV's. 2 " The FCC has been chosen as the
agency to regulate satellite communications. 274 However,
the FCC has no interest in regulating launch vehicles.
Satellites, regardless of their intended use, are payloads-
not launch vehicles. Thus while the FCC may properly
regulate some use of the private objects put into space by
private industry, the FCC has little interest in regulating
the payload delivery systems.
The Department of State, although appointed as the in-
terim lead agency prior to the designation of the DOT,
would not be the best choice for the lead agency. The
State Department's primary interest is in ensuring that the
United States meets its treaty obligations and that any ex-
port concerns are satisfied.275 Some believe that the State
Department would not be able to create the proper regu-
latory climate to encourage and promote private space ac-
276tivities. 6 Moreover, the State Department apparently
has difficulty discharging its current space policy responsi-
bilities concerning international telecommunications.2 77
Similarly, the Department of Defense is clearly not the
proper regultory body for private space activities.
Although the Defense Department has a role in establish-
ing the export controls of the United States, this is a rela-
tively limited aspect of the approval process once the
policy decision to encourage private launchings is made.
While the United States must ensure that the private sec-
tor uses space only for peaceful purposes,27 s this concern
should not dominate the government's regulatory pro-
cess. Moreover, the lead agency should encourage and fa-
cilitate the development of a private ELV industry. As a
.1 See id. (FCC has limited expertise in space related areas).
274 See Myers, supra note 16, at 9-10 (FCC regulates satellite communications).
2.1 See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (discussing Department of
State concerns).
276 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 102, 116, 139.
277 Id. at 116 (statement of Akaka). See also id. at 144 (Statement of Nelson)
(State Department "does not know often one hand from the other what it's
doing").
279 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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military body the Defense Department is ill-suited to pro-
mote such a civilian business. Finally, the Department of
Defense has no mandate to regulate private industry in
any civilian context. 279 As Representive Akaka put it, the
Department of Defense "has better things to do. ' 28 0 The
Department of Defense should, of course, exercise au-
thority over any private launches conducted from its
facilities.
Representative Akaka originally advocated placing the
primary regulatory responsibility in the Department of
Commerce, asserting that the Department of Commerce
has the necessary legislative mandate and that the ELV
industry is a component of commerce.28 ' While this may
be correct, the Commerce Department has less technical
expertise than any other agency mentioned above. More-
over, the Commerce Department lacks any clear depart-
mental direction and would thus absorb the lead agency
as just another agency under the Commerce umbrella. In
Akaka's revised legislation, 8 2 the DOT replaces the De-
partment of Commerce as the lead agency,283 thus sug-
gesting that the Department of Commerce is no longer a
likely candidate for the lead agency position.
B. Structure of the Regulatory Process and Functions of the
Launch Agency
The Executive Order directing the DOT to oversee the
regulation of private ELV operations lists a number of re-
sponsibilities of the lead agency.28 4 The Order provides
that the DOT shall, inter alia,
219 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Akaka).
280 Id.
281 Id. Represenative Akaka explained that "we are creating a new industry in
this country and, as such, from a philosophic and policy point of view, this indus-
try belongs under the Department of Commerce." Id. Akaka had introduced leg-
islation that would establish the Department of Commerce as the lead agency. See
supra note 229 (discussing H.R. 3942).
282 H.R. REP. No. 3942, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
283 Id. § 4(8) at 3.
284 See ELV Executive Order, supra note 32, § 2, at 7211.
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- promote and encourage commercial ELV operations;
- lead the establishment of procedures to expedite pri-
vate launch approvals;
- serve as the single point of contact for the collection
and distribution of ELV license applications and
documentation;
- recommend administrative measures to streamline fed-
eral licensing procedures.285
The Order also officially establishes an interagency group
to advise and assist the DOT in carrying out its responsi-
bilities. 28 6 The Order further directs all departments and
agencies to:
- provide the Department of Transportation with infor-
mation on relevant regulatory actions;
- eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to ELV de-
velopment and ensure that essential regulations are ad-
ministered as efficiently as possible;
- establish timetables for expeditious treatment of appli-
cations for approval of ELV activities."'
Moreover, the Order makes clear that it does not "dimin-
ish or abrogate any statutory or operational authority ex-
ercised by any other Federal agency. ' 28 8 Thus the Order
actually confers very little power on the DOT.
Consistent with this conclusion, the DOT has indicated
that each of the agencies concerned will retain their regu-
latory authority. 28 9 Rather than taking over any existing
regulatory roles, the DOT claims promotional and der-
egulatory roles.290 In its promotional function the DOT
will focus on reducing customs burdens29' to attract for-
28 Id.
286 Id. The interagency group is composed of representatives from the Depart-
ment of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the
FCC, and NASA. Id.
287 Id. at 7211-12.
288 Id. at 7212.
289 DOT Press Release, supra note 28, at 2.
2o Ross, supra note 101, at 2.
2' Id. If a user in a foreign country must pay an expensive customs duty to take
its payload into the United States for a launch, United States ELV companies will
be at a competitive disadvantage in the world launch services market. Companies
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eign payloads, to promote favorable tax treatment of the
ELV industry, and examine other potential barriers to de-
velopment.2 92 In its deregulatory mode the DOT will at-
tempt to reduce the government regulation and
paperwork to that required to protect the domestic and
international interests of the United States.293 In this ca-
pacity, the DOT will work with the seventeen agencies
that have "colorable claims to jurisdiction over private
rocket launches in order to determine which are truly
valid jurisdictional claims. ' 294 The DOT will also en-
courage these agencies to simplify their procedures and ex-
pedite their decision-making. 29 5 Finally, the DOT intends
to establish a "one stop shopping" procedure-a single
point of contact for launching companies to determine
what approvals are necessary for a particular launch. 296
Thus the DOT will simply serve to gather all of the rele-
vant information from the applicant and disseminate it to
the various agencies. Although the Launch Agency could
impose time limitations to speed up the process and elimi-
nate duplicative interagency approvals, there will still be
several separate approvals necessary to launch.
It therefore appears that the lead agency, rather than
issuing a single license to launch, will merely coordinate
the efforts of the various agencies to reduce the regulatory
burden. This move will not, however, minimize the regula-
tory burden. It will be difficult for the DOT to weed out
inappropriate or burdensome regulations when it lacks
the power to implement its determinations. If the DOT
launching from nations that impose a smaller duty on the importation of the
payload will have an artificial advantage.
292 Id.
-' Id. Apparently one of the reasons that the President assigned the lead
agency task to the DOT was the agency's successful experience in deregulating
other modes of transportation. See id.
2- Id. at 3. The DOT has suggested that some assertions of jurisdiction are
inappropriate, indicating that "some ... claims have more 'color' than others."
Id.
295 Id. The DOT will facilitate negotiations between the applicant and the gov-
ernment agencies by "explaining an applicant's case before another agency." Id.
296 Id. See also ELV Hearings, supra note 25, at 6.
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evaluates a particular launch and concludes that no export
license is necessary to protect the interests of the United
States, the State Department may nonetheless require
such a permit. Rather than decreasing interdepartmental
jealousies by preserving each agency's jurisdiction, con-
flicts between the agencies will increase to the extent that
agencies disagree with the propriety of the DOT's advice.
In this context, the "lead agency" is merely an advisory
board coordinating the regulation of private ELV's.
It would be more appropriate to establish within the
DOT a separate agency to. regulate ELV operations.29 7
This Launch Agency should, working with the other rele-
vant agencies,298 establish and apply a single set of guide-
lines or regulations to govern private launches. 99 Private
companies wishing to launch a rocket would then take the
necessary information to the Launch Agency, and within a
stated time period, receive an authorization to launch.
The Launch Agency could draw upon the expertise of
NASA, the FAA, and the State Department as necessary to
apply and interpret the regulations until such time as the
297 SIG REPORT, supra note 27, at II ("DOT/FAA should be responsible for ad-
ministering commercial launch range safety regulations, once developed").
298 The Launch Agency should also give the industry and other interested par-
ties, as well as Congress, an opportunity to comment on the proposed regula-
tions. Id. at 1.
2- See generally SIG REPORT, supra note 27.
The SIG Group recommended that the "Lead Agency chair an interagency
group of affected Federal agencies and those that possess appropriate technical
and operational expertise in space launches to develop the minimum necessary
procedures or regulations for licensing and supervising commercial ELV launch
range operations from [United States] commercial ranges." SIG REPORT, supra
note 27, at 5. In addition, the Working Group recommended that "the
DOT/FAA be responsible for administering these commercial launch range safety
regulations once developed." Id. While the Group suggested that the individual
agencies should otherwise retain their regulatory authority, id., it appears that
there is little reason not to consolidate all functions into one agency once the
technical range regulations have been established. See contra ELV Hearings, supra
note 25, at 5 (each agency with regulatory authority should be permitted to retain
authority; centralization may impede progress). While it may be necessary to al-
low each agency intitially to keep its jurisdiction, the approval process eventually
should be consolidated into one Launch Agency.
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Launch Agency could develop similar expertise.3 ° °
Otherwise, a launching company still must obtain several
separate approvals before it can legally launch a rocket.
Further, it remains unclear which approvals are in fact
necessary. An export license, for instance, should not be
required simply to launch a rocket.30 ' Although a launch
that entails a flight plan that goes beyond the United
State's territorial waters is technically an export,30 2 the
concerns of the Office of Munitions generally associated
with an export of weapons do not arise with the launch of
a space vehicle. Any portions of the rocket that will fall
into the ocean will generally be recovered by the
launcher. Consequently, the rocket is unlikely to enter
another state or otherwise leave the control of the launch-
ing company. The only legitimate concerns of the De-
partment of State are the compliance with any treaty
obligations of the United States and the indemnification
of any liability resulting from the launch. An export per-
mit is not necessary to satisfy these interests. It seems
anomolous to require an export permit for rockets when
hundreds of airplanes departing from the United States
bound for foreign countries need not obtain an export
permit.30 3
If the Department of State wants to address such con-
cerns, it should do so in a straightforward manner by con-
tributing to the design of the regulations. There is no
need for the Department of State to independently evalu-
ate factors that are addressed by the regulations. Indeed,
soo See ELV Hearings, supra note 25, at 5 (acquisition of technical expertise by
single agency will take time).
-1 See Myers, supra note 16, at 8 (questioning whether there is legal basis for an
imposing an export license requirement on private launches). Apparently, private
ELV companies have complied with the export license procedure to avoid a
lengthy and expensive challenge to the Department of State's claimed authority.
See id.
302 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing application of ex-
port laws to rocket launches).
-. See 15 C.F.R. § 370.3 (1984) (export license required for all commodities
and technical data, with some exceptions). See also Commercialization Hearings, supra
note 3, at 81 (statement of David Hannah, Jr.) (government not liable for aircraft
landing in foreign countries; should not be liable for spacecraft landing overseas).
[50
PRIVATE ROCKET INDUSTRY
the Department of State has been negotiating with the
DOT to transfer to the lead agency in the DOT the ap-
proval authority under the export regulations. 0 4 If the
lead agency can adequately perform this function, there is
no reason to retain the approval based on the export laws
and regulations. In any event, if the Department of State
retains its regulatory power over ELV's, the export license
requirement will inappropriately remain in place.
Coordination by the DOT also does nothing to effectu-
ate a change in the FAA regulations. The discussion
above demonstrates that regulations drafted for amateur
rocketeers are inadequate for commercial launches. The
FAA, however, should not adopt new regulations that it
would apply through the intermediary DOT lead agency.
Rather, the FAA should work with NASA and the DOT to
draft new regulations that a Launch Agency could em-
ploy. Thereafter, both the FAA and NASA, as appropri-
ate and necessary, could conduct the necessary review of a
particular private launch proposal. This "interagency"
aspect of the process hopefully could be reduced over
time and eventually eliminated as the Launch Agency ac-
quires the expertise needed to apply the regulations.
With respect to the FCC's jurisdiction, there appears to
be nothing about a launching company's request for a fre-
quency that would raise different concerns than other
FCC requests. Thus this routine frequency assignment
easily could be handled between the Launch Agency and
the FCC without extensive investigation by the FCC.
Moreover, when a company establishes a permanent
launch site and acquires a permanent frequency, only one
initial request need be filed. °5 The FCC could take itself
entirely out of the regulation process simply by allocating
104 See generally 1984 Hearings, supra note 69 (various parties discussing the nego-
tiations); see also id. at 7 (statement of Jenna Dorn, Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, DOT).
"I See Myers, supra note 16, at 10.(permanent license from FCC necessary for
permanent private launch sites with regular and frequent launches).
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a frequency to the Launch Agency to use in granting pri-
vate companies approval to launch.
Finally, a truly "one-stop shop" cannot exist until an
enterprise can obtain responses to all of its questions and
satisfy all requirements through a single agency. While
this cannot be done overnight, it makes little sense to wait
until the maturity of the industry demands such an
agency. If the government waits until then, it will be
forced to act overnight to reallocate the necessary skills
into a new agency. It would be far better for a Launch
Agency to mature along with the industry.
The DOT has insisted that it would be inappropriate or
otherwise burdensome to create a single regulatory
agency for private ELV's. 06 The true reason for this posi-
tion, however, is unclear. The DOT asserts that the regu-
latory structure must retain flexibility to allow it to
respond to various different launch situations and tech-
nologies. °7 The DOT assumes that a single set of regula-
tions would be more restrictive than the current multi-
agency approach. 8 It is not enough to say, as the DOT
argues, that the involvement of several agencies is not as
significant a problem as the lack of refined interagency
procedures to minimize duplication and maximize coordi-
309 o
nation. If all of the various government concerns were
addressed by a single agency, no "interagency" proce-
dures would be necessary. There simply is no reason to
continue the "day to day contact" between the commer-
cial ELV agency and other agencies3 10 when a less bur-
" ELV Hearings, supra note 25, at 5; 1984 Hearings, supra note 69, at 48, 51
(statement ofJenna Dorn).
107 1984 Hearings, supra note 69, at 46 (statement ofJenna Dorn). The Director
of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation repeatedly asserted the need
for flexibility and questioned the propriety of adopting a single set of regulations.
See generally id. Yet, the Director could never explain why flexibility could not be
retained in a consolidated regulatory structure.
Io, See 1984 Hearings, supra note 69, at 46-47, 48, 50-51.
See id. at 46-47.
, The Department of Transportation noted that it had virtually "day-to-day
contact" with the various federal agencies when reviewing the Starstruck case. Id.
at 47.
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densome and less time consuming approach is available.
Moreover, it is not at all clear how the adoption of a
single regulatory agency would necessarily increase regu-
lation or otherwise be counterproductive. The DOT em-
phasizes the need for flexibility in the regulatory process,
by arguing that because all possible problems cannot be
anticipated by a single regulatory structure and that it is
too early to establish an extensive set of rules and regula-
tions to govern all launches. 1 It is difficult to under-
stand why the retention of several separate regulatory
bodies increases flexibility. Indeed, a single agency could
employ the existing regulations far more efficiently and
effectively than a consortium of self-interested govern-
ment agencies and departments. While it may be too
early to establish extensive regulations, it is not too early
to establish a single regulatory agency that can grow with
the industry and develop the appropriate regulations over
time.
Finally, even the DOT has apparently recognized the
benefits of putting the entire regulatory structure under
one roof. The DOT is attempting to shift to the lead
agency the launch approval process now handled by the
Department of State through the ITAR process.3 2 Thus,
rather than shunning the centralization of regulatory au-
thority, the DOT appears to approve of such a move in
practice. The advantages of this consolidation would
properly be maximized by placing full regulatory author-
ity for rocket launches and payloads in a single Launch
Agency. A single regulatory body implementing a single
31 Id. at 46, 51.
312 Id. at 49. Another contradiction in the DOT's approach to the regulatory
process is evident in its desire to establish a predictable regulatory structure, id at
46, while retaining the current hodgepodge of regulating agencies. See ELV Exec-
utive Order, supra note 32 (federal agencies retain all existing authority). It will be
quite difficult to provide certainty when no single authority can tell an entrepre-
neur at any point in time precisely what minimum requirements must be met for a
launch. For instance, new technologies will require a new response from fifteen
different agencies under the current system. A single Launch Agency, however,
could provide a single harmonized response to new technologies in a much
shorter time period.
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flexible set of regulations would better minimize the regu-
latory burden on private rocket launches than would a
large group of autonomous bodies employing regulations
that were designed for unrelated purposes.
V. CONTENT OF THE LAUNCH AGENCY REGULATIONS
While the Launch Agency regulations would primarily
be substantive, any complete and technical discussion of
the appropriate substantive measures is beyond the com-
petence of this article. Rather, this section of the article
discusses generally some of the substantive areas that
would be appropriately addressed by the Launch Agency,
as well as a number of important procedural concerns that
the Launch Agency should consider in establishing the
private ELV regulations.
A. Time Limits
Needless to say, the long delay in obtaining the requi-
site approval from the Department of State in the SSI
case 31 3 is unsettling and should not be allowed to occur
under future regulatory procedures. Thus, the Launch
Agency should establish short but reasonable mandatory
time limitations on the approval process, perhaps in the
sixty to ninety day range. When the Launch Agency re-
ceives an application it should immediately disseminate
the pertinent information to any relevant agencies and re-
quire prompt response.3 14 This would enable the Launch
Agency to issue a final permit in a relatively short period
of time.
One factor adding to the delay in obtaining launch ap-
proval in the SSI case was the interagency comment pro-
cedure. Under this procedure, each agency had to request
and receive comments from other affected agencies prior
313 See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text (discussing delay caused by
Department of State).
314 See SIG REPORT, supra note 27, at 12 (recommending 30 day limit on re-
sponses from various agencies to Lead Agency).
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to issuing its authorization.3 15 The State Department pro-
cess illustrates this duplication problem well. The State
Department's three primary concerns had all been satis-
fied by authorizations issued by other agencies.3 6 Yet,
SSI was unable to expedite its application for an export
license from the State Department by communicating this
information to the Department.3 1 7 The State Depart-
ment's lethargic response thus threatened to delay the
launch of the Conestoga even though all relevant con-
cerns had been addressed. SSI encountered the same dif-
ficulty in obtaining its exemption from the FAA
regulations.
The root of the problem was the lack of confidence of
each agency in the competence of the other agencies to
adequately protect the interests of the public and govern-
ment. The lack of trust resulted in the imposition of simi-
lar requirements by several different bodies.3 1 This delay
and duplication can be eliminated by doing away with the
interagency comment procedure. If each agency restricts
its review to its own area of expertise, the Launch Agency
could coordinate the comments of the various interested
government parties and issue a single launch permit.
Each agency will know that a final permit will not issue
until all have commented on the proposed launch.
Another aspect of the regulatory process that unneces-
., See Ross, supra note 101, at 3 (too much "redundancy" in reviews of NASA,
FAA, and Department of Defense on SSI launch).
316 The Department of State ultimately required in its approval of the Cones-
toga launch that SSI obtain insurance, agree to comply with NASA and FAA safety
requirements, and agree to indemnify the United States government for any
launch-related damages for which the United States may be responsible. DOS
Approval, supra note 178, at 1. SSI had complied with these requirements at least
two weeks before the Department of State issued its approval. See Export License
Memo, supra note 172, at 3.
117 The Department of State indicated two weeks before the launch date that an
export license could not be issued before the scheduled launch date, despite SSI's
explanation that all concerns of the Department had been satisfied. Export Li-
cense Memo, supra note 172, at 3.
.1, See Export License Memo, supra note 172, at 3. Three agencies required SSI
to obtain a $100 million insurance policy, while two agencies required indemnifi-
cation of the United States government and two agencies performed safety re-
views. Id.
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sarily delays completion of the application process is the
FAA's use of the Federal Register notice procedure." 9 The
first notice issued by the FAA with respect to SSI's launch
contained little information.3 2 0 A single informative no-
tice, akin to the second notice issued in SSI's case 32 1
would be most appropriate. The FAA should publish a
single notice within ten days of receiving an application
and should require any comments to be submitted within
twenty days.322
Finally, the use of provisional licenses would reduce the
potential time concerns of private enterprise. Such an
"exemption in principle" would give the private company
the security of knowing that a particular launch vehicle,
site, and time were approved, while retaining the flexibil-
ity necessary for the Launch Agency to adjust to last min-
ute or unexpected developments. 23 This would allow the
overall license procedure to operate without delaying ap-
proval until every last detail was available, and thus would
promote reliable private launch schedules.
B. Long Term Licenses
When a company establishes a permanent launch site, a
one-time approval of the site should be sufficient.3 24 The
Launch Agency should restrict the necessary air space to
allow the private enterprise to launch its rockets safely. 25
This would eliminate the need to negotiate a flight plan
with the Launch Agency for each launch. In addition,
when a company plans several launches using the same
type of vehicle, only one review of the design and techni-
cal aspects of the rocket would be necessary. Similarly,
s" See 47 Fed. Reg. 16,243 (Apr. 15, 1982) (first notice); 47 Fed. Reg. 32,229
(July 26, 1982) (second notice).
320 See 47 Fed. Reg. 16,243 (Apr. 15, 1982). See supra notes 144-148 and accom-
panying text (discussing two federal notices).
321 See 47 Fed. Reg. 32,229 (July 26, 1982).
.'2' See MIssIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
3 23 Id.
-12 See id. at 7.
.2- The FAA has procedural rules through which it can process a private com-
pany's request for restricted air space. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 11.61 - 11.75 (1983).
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when a particular type of vehicle has an outstanding track
record, little review should be required. 26 If a space vehi-
cle meets the safety standards established by the Launch
Agency, no purpose is served by duplicating the review
for each successive launch. Thus, a launch license that
would be good for several flights should be available. 27
Of course, any deviation from the original specifications,
if significant, should require additional review. 28 Such an
approach will be increasingly necessary as the launch of
private ELV's becomes routine and the cost and time re-
quired to obtain individual permits becomes too
burdensome.
C. Foreign Launches by United States Companies
It appears that none of the private ELV companies in
the United States currently plan to launch rockets using
facilities located in other countries.3 29 Nonetheless, there
certainly is potential, particularly if the United States
maintains an onerous regulatory procedure, for United
States companies to use foreign launch facilities or facili-
ties located in international waters. At least one United
States company, Starstruck, has designed a rocket that will
launch directly from the surface of the water.3 3 0 This will
allow the company to launch from any point on the ocean,
including locations along the equator, without having to
326 See Murdock, supra note 13, at 14 (FAA could certificate rockets based on
history of outstanding operations).
32 The DOT has already indicated that it supports the multiple launch approval
approach. See Ross, supra note 101, at 4.
328 See Ross, supra note 101, at 4 (deviations from plan beyond parameters of
original approval require new approval). The need for further review in such a
case highlights the need for the central ELV agency to ultimately possess the ex-
pertise necessary to make quick decisions with respect to important changes in the
launch plan. Although the DOT suggests that it "will have available to ...[it]
every bit of expertise needed to make those decisions fairly and quickly," id., such
expertise will not be centrally located. Rather, to the extent that the various agen-
cies perceive that their interests may be affected, each agency must review the
changes and report back to the DOT. Information simply does not travel between
government agencies as quickly, efficiently, and effectively as it does within a sin-
gle coordinated agency that is internally controlled.
5.20 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 3, at 202 (statement of Heiss).
3- See id. at 231 (statement of Bennett).
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use a foreign territory launch site. 3 ' Nonetheless, Star-
struck has indicated that it intends to operate at all times
under the jurisdiction and supervision of the United
States. 32
The Launch Agency must devise special procedures to
respond to companies that choose to launch from points
outside of United States territory. The United States
treaty obligations require the government to regulate any
private launches conducted by nationals of the United
States.
D. Payload Regulation
One problem introduced by completely private launch
services is the lack of government control over the con-
tent of the payload.33 Currently, because all launches are
conducted by NASA, the government knows virtually
everything about each payload.334 NASA has certain spec-
ifications and standards that a private payload must meet.
In a system of private launches, however, the government
will not have a similar institutional control over the char-
acteristics of the payload. There exists a potential that a
private company will, for the sake of profit, launch an ille-
gitimate payload that creates national security risks. Con-
sequently, some form of payload licensing must be
devised. Certain payloads, such as remote sensing satel-
lites, are already under the authority of the Department of
Commerce. 3 5 It seems appropriate, however, for the
Launch Agency itself to oversee the particular payloads
that private companies place in orbit around the earth.
To split the regulatory responsibility for the launch and




.,1" See Ross, supra note 101, at 5 (DOT considering payload monitoring
problem).
134 See id.
.- 5 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1984).
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E. Public Safety
Of course, the Launch Agency should develop regula-
tions, under the guidance of NASA, the FAA, the Depart-
ment of State, and the other relevant agencies, to ensure
that private space and launch activities will not create
hazards for the public and to guarantee that launches will
be adequately insured.336 Although a well planned launch
and launch site should not pose any significant safety
hazards to the public, other users of the relevant airspace
and waterways may be at risk if a rocket malfunctions or
otherwise deviates from its course. Consequently, the
Launch Agency should establish regulations that ensure
the safety of the various aspects of a private launch from a
private range.
As a general rule, such regulations should be geared to-
ward a certain level of performance rather than definitive
design requirements that restrict the innovative talents of
private enterprise.337 Performance standards would re-
quire the ELV companies to accomplish a particular level
of success at achieving the desired objective, without re-
gard to the method used. Design standards would require
companies to employ a specific design to achieve the ob-
jective. The use of performance standards to protect the
public would minimize the burden of the regulatory pro-
cess on private enterprise and would avoid the technolog-
ical stagnation that could result from the use of design
33c The Department of State has listed several domestic concerns that require
regulation:
1. Indemnity for United States government from acts of private
launch companies;
2. Ensuring safety of aircraft during launches;
3. Requiring that launch activities not interfere With
communications;
4. Consideration of state environmental regulations;
5. Ensuring safety in the handling of toxic materials;
6. Assurance that the rocket will not fall apart.
Memorandum from James R. Myers to Space Services Government Regulation
File, September 11, 1981.
',, See Ross, supra note 101, at 5-6 (advocating performance standards for
ELV's).
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standards.338
In addition, the goal of achieving safe launches should
be accomplished with the minimum regulatory burden
necessary. New technologies must be evaluated carefully
before commercial applications are certified, while proven
designs should be usable with less scrutiny. 9 Moreover,
the Launch Agency must balance the potential for public
harm in a particular launch or group of launches with the
burden that regulation will impose on the applicant. If
the risk of harm is slight, due to the remoteness of the
launch location, the flight path, and/or the existence of a
self-destruct capability, the regulatory requirements
should be minimal.3 40 To this end, the FAA has sug-
gested that a minimal regulatory approach, akin to the
one adopted by the FAA for ultralight air vehicles, 3 4 1 is
most appropriate for the ELV industry. 42 Certainly pub-
lic safety is important. Nonetheless, if over-regulated, the
ELV industry may be safe but non-existent. 4 3
All of the licensing agencies appear to rely on the tech-
nical expertise of NASA to assure the safety of private
rocket launches.3 44 The Launch Agency should therefore
remove the "middleman" agencies and work directly with
NASA to devise the technical regulations necessary to en-
sure that private launch activities will be safe. The current
interaction between each of the agencies and NASA is du-
plicative and unnecessary. However, because NASA has
no direct jurisdiction over a completely private launch, 45
there is no other vehicle by which NASA's experience and
33 See id. (design standards "freeze the growth of technology").
339 Murdock, supra note 13, at 14.
340 See id.
341 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1984).
34 See Murdock, supra note 13, at 14.
343 See id. at 12 (questioning whether "infant industry founded by the Wright
Brothers in 1903 would have been able to prosper under an extensive regulatory
system").
344 See Myers, supra note 16, at 6. See also supra notes 93-95 and accompanying
text (regulating agencies rely on NASA's technical expertise).
345 See supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (discussing NASA's lack of
jurisdiction).
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expertise can be brought to bear on private launches.
Consequently, the Launch Agency could reduce the regu-
latory burden on the ELV industry and assure public
safety by establishing its own technical regulations. To
avoid the high cost of acquiring all at once the technical
personnel to apply these regulations, the Launch Agency
should rely on NASA's personnel, as the other agencies
have, 46 until the DOT can develop its own technical
expertise.
F. Launches from Governmental Facilities
When a private company contracts to launch from the
facilities of NASA347 or the Department of Defense,348 the
Launch Agency should only marginally regulate the
launch.349 In such a case it is more appropriate for the
relevant government entity to include in the launch agree-
ment any restrictions necessary to ensure public safety. 50
The Air Force and NASA requirements for the launch of
vehicles from government facilities are sufficient to pro-
tect the public, as well as ensure compliance with all inter-
national obligations of the United States.' Only if the
launch service contract fails to address the appropriate
safety and technical concerns should the Launch Agency
assert its jurisdiction over private launches from NASA or
the Department of Defense launch facilities. To this end
346 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (regulating agencies rely on
NASA's technical expertise).
347 NASA will offer its launch facilities at the Kennedy Space Center for use by
private launch companies. See Myers, supra note 16, at 6-7.
348 The United States Air Force has launch facilities at White Sands, Patrick Air
Force Base, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and Edwards Air Force Base., Id. at 10.
,49 See SIG REPORT, supra note 27, at 4 (no additional requirements or criteria
beyond Department of Defense and NASA requirements or standards should be
imposed on launches from national ranges).
3- See id. (Department of Defense and NASA responsible for controlling
launches from National ranges); See supra notes 96-100, 104 and accompanying
text (NASA and Department of Defense regulate launches that use government
facilities); see also Memorandum from James R. Myers to Space Services Govern-
ment Regulation File, September 11, 1981 (FAA approval may not be necessary
for launch from government launch facilities).
35, SIG REPORT, supra note 27, at 4.
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the President's space interagency group recommended
that no "additional requirements or criteria beyond ex-
isting Department of Defense and NASA requirements or
range standards should be imposed at the National
Ranges unless need for such additional requirements is
clearly established." 3 52
Thus the Launch Agency should be concerned exclu-
sively with private launch activities from private launch
locations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In less than three years, the private expendable launch
vehicle business has grown from a single speculative ven-
ture to a rapidly expanding industry. So new is the indus-
try that the government has not been able to stay abreast
with the developments in the private sector, in neglect of
its international treaty obligations. 3 " The executive
branch has taken important policy initiatives to promote
the commercialization of space. It is now time for the ex-
ecutive branch to implement those policies by recognizing
its authority under the Outer Space Treaty and by estab-
lishing a new Launch Agency that can grow and mature
with the ELV industry.
While the approach to streamlining the existing regula-
tory process discussed above would go a long way toward
solving the problems of private ELV launchers, many
practical issues would remain. For instance, when private
enterprise obtains the capability to transport people into
space, a whole new approach to the regulation of rockets
will be necessary. The establishment of a lead agency that
will ultimately mature into a self-sustaining Launch
Agency, however, would help it to develop the expertise
necessary tQ respond to the development of a private
manned space launch well in advance of its occurrence.
352 Id.
35 The United States has an international obligation to authorize and regulate
non-governmental space activities. OST, supra note 203, art. 6.
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Perhaps the greatest single benefit to adopting a one-
stop license approval process is the simplicity that it offers
to those interested in performing private launch services.
Private enterprise has the technology and the capital to go
far in the development of space and its resources. The
only remaining barrier is the confused regulatory scheme.
The government should reform now, so that SSI will not
be forced to determine which agencies claim an interest in
a particular space vehicle launch. With sensible regula-
tion, the private ELV industry will flourish and contribute
significantly to the United States as a nation, as well as to
the benefit of all mankind.

